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Prologue 
Faust. What is your name? 
Mephistopheles. Small, Sir, The question seems 
From one who gives the Word its lowest rate, 
Who, far removed from semblances and dreams, 
Only the depth of life will contemplate. 
Faust. the nature of you doubtful gentleman 
Nomenclature may help to recognize, 
As may be seen specifically when 
We say Destroyer, Prince of Flies, lies. 
Who then are you? 
Mephistopheles. Part of a power that would 
Alone work evil, but engenders good. 
Faust. What hidden meaning in this riddle lies? 
Mephistopheles. The spirit I, that endless denies. 
Goethe's Faust 
(Part I) 
INTRODUCTION 
The ground of our interrogation is strictly directed 
to what is only implicit in Freud's literature: the theme 
of denial as vice. Our main concern is to show how Freud 
came to understand denial and how the notion of denial 
carries within itself an ethical problem. Understanding 
this implicit ethical problem we decided to draw out what 
is parallel and similar between Freud's writings on 
neurosis and psychosis and the philosophical perspectives 
of Aristotle's writings on ethics. 
By attempting to explicate the direction of our 
investigation we promise neither an absolute clarity nor a 
new system in ethics. What we hope to achieve is a partial 
success; for the ambiguities inherent in Freud's text act 
as a stumbling block as we relate it to the field of ethics 
in general and Aristotle's in particular. As Freud teaches 
us we need to work "step by step" without overburdening 
ourselves with the "need" for an immediate completion. So, 
let us consider this investigation as a response to the 
invitation of many philosophers and psychologists, such as 
Jacques Lacan, Paul Ricoeur, William Richardson, etc. to 
turn back to Freud's psychoanalysis and attempt to evaluate 
its contributions; it might add an indispensable novelty to 
any intellectual and practical endeavors. 
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The first chapter attempts to define denial as a 
mechanism which occurs in states of psychosis, neurosis and 
normality. This is an application of Freud's perspectives 
on the two major different opposing directions the psychic 
energy tends to traverse: regression and progression. 
considering these two directions, we will show the 
differences which characterize regression in normal 
development and those which characterize neurotic and 
psychotic denial. 
The second chapter attempts to draw the framework of 
the major question: Can we consider denial as vice? The 
answer is yes. In order to develop our investigation, 
Aristotle's writings on ethics are considered in relation 
to the psychological writings of Freud. This relation is 
taken into account on the basis of finding the common 
places between Freud and Aristotle. Aristotle's three 
major notions of the excessive, the mean and the deficient 
are going to be related to the functions of the id, ego and 
superego as Freud sees their excessive and deficient 
functions conducive to sickness or health. Given the 
similarities between Freud and Aristotle we will come to 
understand how both seriously take into account that which 
"ruins" health and the person's relation to the external 
world. 
Chapter three is an answer to this question: how do 
we encounter denial in an educational setting? Three 
2 
inextricably interwoven symptomatic notions are to be 
considered: separateness, anxiety and perception. 
considering them separately, we will show how the 
regressive phenomenon of denial has negative effects on the 
student's function as a social being. Being intimately 
connected, we will see how anxiety is a phenomenon of 
separateness originated in the child's experience of the 
absence of the mother which in turn is experienced as 
danger. We will also see how denial results in distortions 
and inaccuracies in perceiving the external world. 
The fourth chapter answers the following question: 
What are some of the virtues implied in Freud's 
psychoanalysis? In order to see this implicit side three 
important notions are to be discussed: common sense, 
psychopathology and the theory of cure. These three 
notions unfold the perspective that to be an articulate 
person is the weapon against vice. They also show us that 
functioning well is the heart of virtue; and functioning 
well is a tendency in the psyche which counteracts any 
conscious or unconscious malfunctions. In other words, we 
will see how building the virtues is what keeps the harmony 
between inherent pathology and inherent health. To 
substantiate our discussion, again, we will consider 
Aristotle's writings on ethics as evidence to what we will 
prove. 
Finally, what is left is to acknowledge the fact that 
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investigating the relationship between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis is still in its infancy. If by any chance 
our research proves to be "partout et nulle part," i.e., 
neither satisfies the psychologist nor the philosopher, we 
should not be discouraged, instead we should follow what 
Freud teaches us that we should consider things step by 
step and never hesitate to reconsider the same phenomenon 
again and again. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the notion of 
denial in Freud's literature. Undoubtedly, defining a 
notion aims at "clarity of understanding," and it also aims 
at drawing the line of demarcation in a distinct fashion. 
In other words, explanation becomes an important factor in 
contributing to the field of "knowledge," and in clarifying 
the meaning of denial and its characteristics as 
distinguished from other notions. But, it may be 
disappointing to find out that some ambiguities and some 
confusions are evident in Freud's texts which may lead the 
investigator to pose unanswered questions. Due to his 
authentic scientific approach, Freud admits this fact and 
leaves these ambiguities and confusions liable for future 
clarifications. 
It is almost humiliating that, after working so 
long, we should still be having difficulties in 
understanding the most fundamental facts. But we 
have made up our minds to simplify nothing and to 
hide nothing. If we cannot see things clearly we 
will at least see clearly what the obscurities 
5 
are. 1 
The presence of ambiguities should not discourage us. 
on the contrary, they are sources of "excitement" as a 
means of discovering the "beyond." Without this excitement 
our search to uncover the truth would be dull and boring. 
confronting these ambiguities and confusions we might 
"limp" without being capable of "flying." That said, in 
addition to many sub-questions, two major questions should 
be answered: 1) What is denial according to Freud? 
2) What is the context in which Freud came to tackle this 
important notion? I will start with the latter. 
The Context 
Freud found himself in an enigmatic position in 
explicating his crucial notion of the unconscious. In the 
last section of his paper "The Unconscious" he acknowledges 
the fact that the results of his discussion of the 
unconscious is rather unclear. "It is certainly not much, 
and at some points it gives an impression of obscurity and 
confusion. 11 2 This impasse brought him to search for 
another alternative by which a proper and a clearer 
explanation could be attained. So, he made an interruptive 
appeal to schizophrenia. He says, "It is only the analysis 
1. s. Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Trans & ed. J. 
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, from 1953), v. xx, p. 
124. 
2. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. V. XIV, p. 196. 
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of schizophrenia that promises to furnish us with 
conceptions through which the enigmatic unconscious will pe 
brought more within the reach113 ... "[It] is 
indispensable for a general understanding of the 
unconscious. 11 4 The important position of schizophrenia is 
its " ..• reference to the anti-thesis between ego and 
object. 11 5 Considering the importance of the ego in 
relation to its object, in schizophrenia, the regression 
extends "not merely to narcissism but to a complete 
abandonment of object-love and a return to infantile auto-
eroticism.116 It is worth noting that regression according 
to Freud is nothing "than a name (for) an inexplicable 
phenomenon. 11 7 This suggests that regression has unknown 
implications. 
Now, what is this infantile-eroticism? Originally, 
Freud says that the infant exists in a state of an 
"undifferentiated immediacy." This means that the infant 
cannot distinguish between the ego and the object; "to 
start with, the child certainly makes no distinction 
between the breast and his own body. 118 In other words, the 
3. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XIV, p. 196. 
4. Ibid. p. 203. 
5. Ibid. p. 196. 
6. s. Freud, standard Edition, v. XII, p. 77. 
7. s. Freud, standard Edition, v. v. , p. 543. 
8. s. Freud, standard Edition, v. XXIII, p. 188. 
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"includes everything. 119 The ego is the world. This is ego 
to say that the breast of the mother is the infant's world 
and the infant's world is the breast of the mother. It is 
a state of unified presence in one unified world., i.e., a 
"psychical rest." 
Realization of the External World 
What does this tell us? 1) The infant is in a state 
of "helplessness." 2) The infant is unilaterally dependent 
on an external reality which he is not aware of as external 
to himself. 3) As a result the necessity of external 
reality imposes itself as a factor of separation between 
the infant and his mother. Gradually, the infant starts to 
notice the absence or the separation: " ... When the breast 
has to be separated" Freud says, "from his body and shifted 
to the 'outside' because he so often finds it absent, it 
carries with it now that it is an 'object' a part of the 
original narcissistic cathexis. 11 10 Thus for the first 
time, the infant realizes that there is something existing 
"outside." The emergence of the external world starts to 
have an impact on the infant. The infant starts to realize 
his own dependence on this outside world which starts with 
the need for the mother. Then, what happens? 
To go into details is not the purpose of this chapter. 
Suffice to outline the main points of Freud's description 
9. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXI, p. 68. 
10. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXIII, p. 188. 
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of this important transition period. This is stated as it 
appears in the last section of the Interpretation of 
Qreams. 1) Internal needs such as hunger or thirst appear. 
2 ) The satisfaction of these needs is attained by either 
the mother or by "hallucination." 3) The unavoidable 
internal needs and their satisfaction by either the mother 
or by hallucination show that the infant acts under the 
influence of a spontaneous reflex apparatus. According to 
Freud, these three stages obey the "pleasure principle." 
They are called the "primary process." 4) Hallucination 
comes to a point when it proves to be unsatisfactory to the 
infant. Consequently, the reality testing principle 
emerges. This is called the "secondary process." This 
obeys the law of the 11 unpleasure principle." How the 
unpleasure principle emerges is ambiguous in Freud's 
thought. 
What does Freud imply by the unpleasure principle? 
The state of the "psychical rest" mentioned before implies 
a purpose of staying in this "Nirvana" by avoiding 
stimulation from the external world. But, according to 
Freud, these internal needs are not "operative11 without the 
stimulation from the external world which impinges on the 
infant's "reflex system." To be faithful to the "Nirvana" 
state, these stimulations are avoided by reflex activities, 
such as kicking and screaming by which the infant calls the 
mother in order to restore the lost unity. Freud considers 
9 
these reflex activities as "motor flight." These automatic 
spontaneous activities Freud describes as "an original 
attempt at flight from the external world with its emission 
of stimuli. 11 11 Yet, one must bear in mind that this 
"psychic rest" not only receives or is disturbed by 
external stimulation. It is also disturbed by internal 
instinctual needs. In this regard, the infant is caught up 
by the inner stimulation and the outer stimulation. This 
state is clearly expressed in "Instincts" in the form of an 
invented case. 
Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an 
almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet 
unoriented in the world, which is receiving 
stimuli in its nervous substance. This organism 
will very soon be in a position to make a first 
distinction and a first orientation. On the one 
hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be 
avoided by muscular action (flight); these 
ascribe to our external world. On the other 
hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against 
which such action is of no avail and whose 
character of constant pressure persists in spite 
of it. These stimuli are the signs of our 
internal world, the evidence of instinctual 
needs. The perceptual substance of the living 
11. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XIV, p. 136. 
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organism will thus have found in the efficacy of 
its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing 
between an •outside' and an 'inside. 1 12 
Having in mind what we mentioned about the auto-erotic 
stage or the 'Nirvana' state, this crucial state is called 
by Freud "the original reality ego." This differs from the 
reality testing ego which is developed upon the impinging 
of stimulations from the external world. What is really 
important is that this confrontation with the external 
world assures a series of complex inner interrelated 
activities whose main objective is to change the external 
world. This is what really led Freud to conclude that 
instincts are "the true motive forces behind the advances 
[which] have led the nervous system, with its unlimited 
capacities, to its present high level of development. 11 13 
In this sense, the high level of development is meant to 
be, we think, in the Freudian sense, the capacity to have 
the "passage" to the external world. In other words, the 
infant "takes into itself," "incorporates," "introjects," 
"devours," and "establishes one identification" with the 
object. Yet, the infant "expels," "projects" and "throws 
outside" all that gives rise to unpleasurable feelings. 
Freud expresses this in his paper on Negation: 
Expressed in the language of the oldest ... the 
12. Ibid. I p. 119. 
13. Ibid., p. 120. 
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oral ••. instinctual impulse, the judgement is: 
'I should like to eat this' or 'I should like to 
spit it out'; and put more generally: 'I should 
like to take this into myself and to keep that 
out.' That is to say: "It shall be inside me' 
or 'it shall be outside me.' As I have shown 
elsewhere, the original pleasure ego wants to 
introject into itself everything that is good and 
to eject from itself everything that is bad.14 
From the above discussion we come to know that the 
infant moves onward from a state of oneness with the mother 
(auto-erotic) to a state of separation from the mother 
which is fundamental to the formation of the ego testing of 
the external reality. In the Ego and the Id, Freud 
explains in detail the ego as "essentially the 
representation of the external world."15 We also come to 
know that in schizophrenia there is a psychotic wishful 
attempt to regress back to this "Nirvana" state by 
detaching oneself from the external world. This separation 
from the external world is similar to the separation of the 
infant from his or her mother which in turn gives rise to 
hallucination as an attempt to restore again the lost 
relationship. In the following section we will introduce 
further explanation of schizophrenia as an extreme case of 
14. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIX, p. 236-237. 
15. Ibid., p. 25. 
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denial. The theme of schizophrenia became important as a 
means to overcome the difficulties Freud encountered 
concerning the unconscious. The question is, what are the 
characteristics of schizophrenia that Freud thought of as 
valuable in understanding the unconscious? In order to 
answer the question let us first state the precise 
difference Freud gave between the conscious and the 
unconscious as an answer to the question he had posed at 
the beginning of "The Unconscious": 
we now seem to know all at once what the 
difference i~ between a conscious and an 
unconscious presentation. The two are not, as we 
supposed, different psychical localities, nor yet 
different functional states of cathexis in the 
same locality; but the conscious presentation 
comprises the presentation of the thing plus the 
presentation of the word belonging to it, while 
the unconscious presentation is the presentation 
of the thing alone."16 
In regard to this difference between the unconscious and 
the conscious, a pathological state means a failure in 
"translating" the "thing presentations" into "word 
presentations" which in their normal conditions remain in 
contact with the object. 
So, how do we see schizophrenia in this context? In 
16. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XIV, p. 204. 
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this context, the origin of schizophrenia, according to 
Freud, is a "dispositional fixation" that "lies somewhere 
at the beginning of the course of development from auto-
eroticism to object-love. 1117 This is to say, at the 
beginning the object-love is not differentiated by the 
infant. In other words, the object-love is "me" and the 
infant is unable to draw the line of demarcation which is 
represented by "I am not it." In his paper:"Psychoanalytic 
Notes on the Autobiographical Account of a Case of 
Paranoia," Freud provides us with the case of Schreber who 
came to speak of an internal catastrophe and a belief that 
the end of the world is at hand. In this state of mind, 
Schreber showed detachment from things he previously loved 
and from people. This state of detachment is called by 
Freud "the survival of the self alone." It is a state of a 
detachment from the external world. Although this case 
shows Schreber as paranoic, yet, as a matter of degree a 
schizophrenic shows an extreme detachment from the external 
world. The schizophrenic shows the following: 
1) Gives up object cathexis. 
2) Returns to a primitive objectless condition of 
auto-eroticism. 
3) Exhibits to a great degree disorganized and 
incomprehensible sentences. 
4) Refers to bodily organs. 
17. S. Freud, Standard Edition, XII p. 77. 
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S) utters words that predominate over what has to do 
with things, i.e., cathexis on word presentations 
rather than thing presentations. 
6) Treats concrete things as though they were 
abstract. 
7) Denies external reality. 
8) Hallucinates to restore what was lost. 
Having these characteristics in mind, we notice that there 
is a split between the two worlds. The link between them 
is broken. In "The Unconscious," Freud maintains, "What we 
have permissibly called conscious presentation of the 
object now be split up into the presentation of the word 
and the presentation of the thing. 11 18 Freud does not 
elucidate the different mechanics in a psychotic disavowal 
of external reality. He says that the "elucidation of the 
various mechanisms which are designed, in the psychoses, to 
turn the subject away from reality and to reconstruct 
reality--this is a task for specialized psychiatric study 
which has not yet been taken at hand. 11 19 What is really 
shown in Freud's comment is a problem that demands a clear 
expression. A concept would be much clearer if we contrast 
it with other concepts. That said, one still feels that 
obtaining an absolute clarity in Freud's literature could 
be disappointing. The notions are overlapped and 
18. s. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIV, p. 204. 
19. s. Freud, standard Edition, v. XIX, p. 186. 
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ambiguities are inevitable. The least we can do is to try. 
If our try will prove fruitless, all we can say is that it 
is worth the try. Let us start with the differences 
between neurosis and psychosis. It is worth noting that 
neither the term "denial" nor "disavowal" is used in 
"Neurosis and Psychosis" nor in the "Ego and the Id." But 
what is really important is to decipher the text and try to 
find out what is implicit rather than what is only 
explicit. In "The Ego and the Id," Freud specifies the 
difference between neurosis and psychosis: " • t ..• neurosis is 
the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, 
whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar 
disturbance in the relations of the ego and the external 
world."20 Freud specifies this difference as a "genetic" 
one. Moreover, neurosis, according to Freud, maintains its 
dependence on the external world. In schizophrenia there 
is "a loss of all participation in the external world. 11 21 
As to the notion of disavowal or denial, in "Narcissism," 
Freud maintains that " •.• neurosis does not disavow reality, 
it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to 
replace it.n22 
But Freud modifies his perspective on neurosis and 
psychosis. In psychosis, Freud claims that the detachment 
20. Ibid., p. 149. 
21. Ibid. p. 151. 
22. Ibid. p. 185. 
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from external reality is "rarely if ever complete." How 
does this happen? Freud refers it to a split in the mind. 
ae says, 
Two mental attitudes have been formed instead of 
a single one ••• the normal one, which takes 
account of reality, and another which under the 
influence of the instincts detaches the ego from 
reality. The two exist alongside of each other. 
The issue depends upon their relative strength. 
If the second is or becomes the stronger the 
necessary condition for a psychosis is 
present. 11 23 
This also applies to neurosis. In fetishism as well as in 
some other forms of neurosis, denial of the external world 
is "half measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from 
reality. 11 24 This denial of the external world is "always 
supplemented by an acceptance. 11 25 It seems that there is 
an overlapping of issues. A neurotic person and a 
psychotic person suffer from a split in the ego. What is 
really the difference, we think, is only a matter of 
degree. Psychosis is an extreme form of denial and 
neurosis is a less extreme form of denial. Yet, we notice 
that there is a "continuity" between the two mental 
23. Ibid. p. 202. 
24. Ibid. p. 204. 
25. Ibid. 
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sicknesses. Unfortunately, Freud does not clearly specify 
the total distinction. 
Although he discusses the notion of the split in the 
ego as it appears in his unfinished paper "Splitting of the 
Ego," in his "Outline of Psychoanalysis," and in other 
papers, the notion of denial was treated. But for Freud, 
as the proverb says, "plus tard aue jamais" is beneficial. 
In his paper "Fetishism," the notion of denial becomes the 
center of his discussion. In this paper, Freud comes to a 
striking definition of denial: 
A new technical term is justified when it 
describes a new fact or emphasizes it •... The 
oldest word in our psychoanalytical terminology, 
"repression," already relates to this 
pathological process. If we wanted to 
differentiate more sharply between the 
vicissitude of the idea as distinct from the 
affect, and reserve the word 'Verdrangung' 
('repression') for the affect, then the correct 
German word for the vicissitude of the idea would 
be 'Verleugnung' ('disavowal') or denia1.26 
The notion of disavowal has two different contexts. 
The first is that which facilitates the developmental 
process of the child. Disavowal, in this context, is not 
dangerous as it is in the schizophrenic. In "Infantile 
26. s. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XXI, p. 153. 
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Genital organization," Freud maintains, "Or, again, a 
process may set in which I should like to call a 
•disavowal,' a process which in the mental life of children 
seems neither uncommon nor very dangerous but which in an 
adult would mean the beginning of psychosis." 27 How does 
Freud explain this unharmful disavowal? In the same paper 
he says, 
we know how children react to their first 
impressions of the absence of a penis. They 
disavow the fact and believe that they do see a 
penis all the same. They gloss over the 
contradiction between observation and 
preconception by telling themselves that the 
penis is still small and will grow bigger 
presently; and they then slowly come to the 
emotionally significant conclusion that after all 
the penis had at least been there before and been 
taken away afterwards. The lack of penis is 
regarded as a result of a castration, and so now 
the child is faced with the task of coming to 
terms with castration in relation to himself. 
The further developments are too well known 
generally to make it necessary to recapitulate 
them here." 28 
27. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIX, p. 253. 
28. Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
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From the above discussion we notice that Freud's way 
of thinking is a paradoxical one. This is to say that in 
Freud's thought what is normal could be abnormal at a later 
stage and vice-versa. 'This leaves us with a state of 
puzzling ambiguities if\we want to follow the linear way of 
thinking. Paul Ricoeur in his book Freud and Philosophy 
describes Freud's thought as the logic of the illogical. 
we can also look at this kind of thought as the thought of 
interrelatedness. Donald Davidson in his celebrated 
article "Paradoxes of Irrationality" also shows that the 
agents of the psyche, the ego, the id and the superego are 
"semi-independent" agents. In other words, in regard to 
Freud's way of thinking it is like someone who says yes and 
no at the same time. It is the logic of the dialectic 
whose synthesis is an ongoing process. But this should not 
blind us if we have in mind Moliere's statement quoted by 
Freud in his XVIII lecture "Fixation Upon Traumas: The 
Unconscious," "Il ya fagots et fagots." This means, 
according to Freud, that there is knowing and there is 
knowing, and psychoanalysis is a way of knowing different 
from other ways of knowing. It is a new language as Paul 
Ricoeur says.29 That said, let us consider the state of 
sleep which is a normal aspect of our everyday life and see 
how a psychotic action of the psyche could penetrate or 
29. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans D. Savage 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 
3. 
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take part in what is normal. 
In his outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud identifies 
dream action with "psychotic" actions. "The Unconscious" 
in which he formulates the relations between the conscious 
and the unconscious is considered to be an illumination on 
his theory of dreams. Freud proposes that dreams are 
compared with "pathological states akin to them." Why? 
The characteristics of dreams are like those of 
schizophrenia; they are " ••• almost complete withdrawal from 
the surrounding world and a cessation of interest in it.n30 
since the ego is the agent formed by the stimulations 
impinging from the external world, the ego detaches itself 
from this external world and regresses to a state of 
primitive narcissism; " •.. in the state of sleep, the [ego] 
is carried to the point of restoring primitive 
narcissism."31 Regression does not only effect the ego, it 
also effects the libido. In the state of sleep the libido 
" ... goes back to the stage of hallucinatory satisfaction of 
wishes.n32 This is to say that there is a "withdrawal of 
cathexis from all ideas of objects from both the 
preconscious and the unconscious portions of those 
ideas.n33 
30. s. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XIV, p. 222. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid., p. 223. 
33. Ibid., p. 224. 
21 
But, this is not to understand that there is a 
complete withdrawal of cathexis. The unconscious retains 
some of its cathexis as well as the preconscious retains 
some of its. In other words, in dreams, "word-
presentations are taken back to the thing presentations 
which belong to them. 1134 This movement must not mislead us 
when it is said that dreams have schizophrenic actions. 
What is common between dreams and schizophrenia is that 
both show two major characteristics: 1) A withdrawal from 
the external world, and 2) a hallucinatory quality. How 
hallucination comes into this Freud does not adequately 
explain. What is dissimilar between schizophrenia and 
dreams is that in dreams there is a free association 
between word-cathexes (Preconscious) and thing-cathexis 
(Unconscious). In schizophrenia this association does not 
occur. In this sense, in dreams there is a process by 
which the psyche, to a large extent, detaches itself from 
the external world in order to mirror or reflect upon 
itself. Both states, the waking state and the sleeping 
state, are interrelated by a back and forth movement; one 
withdraws from external reality in order to come back to it 
in the waking state, i.e. external reality testing. How 
similar to the French proverb: "Reculez pour mieux 
sautez." 
In this matter, reality testing is not fully explained 
34. Ibid., p. 228. 
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d It seems that Freud has a via neqativa style. bY Freu · -
He explains what is normal by what is pathological, "We can 
already learn from pathology the way in which reality-
testing may be done away with or put out of action. 11 35 
Reality testing is put out of action because the ego has to 
"disavow" what is found to be unbearable in the external· 
reality. Consequently, the ego breaks off its relation 
with this reality. But having in mind what was said 
before, that detachment from external reality could be 
extreme but rarely complete, the psyche tries to adjust 
itself in a homeostatic way; in this case the "wish" is a 
means to restore its lost homeostatic action. Then a 
wishful psychosis is a reaction to 11 ••• a loss which reality 
affirms, but which the ego has to disavow. 11 36 This is to 
say that a "wish" tries to regain what has been lost. 
What does this mean in a non-pathological state? What 
it really means is that Freud did not only intend to 
investigate the pathogenic side of the psyche. What he 
really intended to investigate is the normal development of 
the human being. His concern was with man in the world as 
Franz Alexander implies in his book, The Western Mind in 
Transition.3 7 A person who is able to "participate" in the 
35. Ibid., p. 233. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Franz Alexander, The Western Mind in Transition (New 
York: Random House, 1960) . 
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world, to integrate conflicts, to develop a readiness for 
this world in which he or she lives. Integration, 
participation and readiness find their root or nucleus not 
in the present, but in the past and extend their influence 
to the present and the future. These three notions as 
implied by Freud are seen within the context of inter-
relatedness of the past, present and future. Lack of 
integration mostly resides in the past in a "precipitating 
situation." The inadequate early integration results in a 
fragile defense mechanism. In other words, there is a 
"symbolic repetition" of the early undesirable events. The 
dependency of the child is an extremely important notion 
which assumes the sociability of the human being. Denial 
of these external relationships destroys the possible 
readiness for integration and participation. In his 
"Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," 
Freud comments on the importance of external reality, 
We are now confronted with the task of 
investigating the development of neurotics and of 
mankind in general to reality, and in this way of 
bringing the psychological significance of the 
real external world into the structure of our 
theories.38 
The Notion of Denial or Disavowal 
In this section two main approaches are going to be 
38. s. Freud, standard Edition, v. XII, p. 218. 
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discussed. The first is understanding denial as distinct 
from repression. The second approach is understanding . 
denial as a matter of degree. The reader must be cautioned 
that an absolute clarity may not be achieved due to some 
ambiguities in Freud's text. Facing such a challenge, it 
would be enough to acknowledge "the obscurities." This is 
Freud's honest wish. Facing this challenge, let us try to 
uncover what could be implicit in some of Freud's texts. 
Let us start with denial as seen in relation to 
repression which is according to Freud the primary factor 
in the genesis of neurosis. In his "Psycho-analytic Notes 
on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" and 
in his "Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning," denial or disavowal appears in a disguised 
fashion. In the latter, Freud says about neurosis that it 
" ... has as its result and probably therefore as its 
purpose, a forcing of the patient out of real life, an 
alienating of him from reality. 11 39 In this context, the 
defense mechanism used by Freud in regard to schizophrenia 
as well as to neurosis is repression (Ablehnung) . The word 
"disavowal" is not used, but implied as detachment from 
real life. The dilemma remains in giving a technical word 
other than repression to the mechanism by which doing away 
with reality occurs. In his Introductory Lectures, Freud 
comes up with a temporary solution. He gives denial as an 
39. Ibid. 
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equal meaning to repression. But he concludes with this 
cautious statement, "so far as we know at present. 1140 This 
means that he was prepared for further investigations. 
Freud's interrogative investigations shows that he was 
aware of a different process than repression. For example, 
in "Narcissism" his interrogation pointed to disavowal 
without specifying it. This is explicitly apparent in 
finding the difference between 'repression' in 
schizophrenia and 'repression' in neuroses. At those 
difficult intellectual times the notion of repression was 
not clear enough as it appears in "Repression", due to his 
difficulty in explaining the relationships between the 
conscious and the unconscious. Although in the 
"Unconscious" he came to terms with these relationships, 
the notion of repression remained an enigma. The impasse 
reached its peak in "A Metaphysical Supplement to the 
Theory of Dreams," and without having a clear explanation, 
he called the process of detachment from external reality 
"disavowal." 
In "Infantile Genital Organization" for the first time 
Freud technically uses the word denial. This in relation 
to the reaction of the little boy to his discovery that 
women don't have a penis. The little boy denies what 
reality affirms. In other words, he refuses to recognize 
the traumatic perception of the physiological reality of 
40. s. Freud, Standard Edition, V. XVI, p. 421. 
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the opposite sex. It is a trauma that is normal for the 
development of children although it shows a schizophrenic 
reaction. According to this discovery, Freud, at last, 
solved his intellectual enigma. As discussed and defined 
before in this chapter, and as it is shown in "Fetishism," 
as well as in the Ego and the Id, neurosis is the conflict 
between the ego and the id, psychosis is the conflict 
between the ego and the external world. Considering this, 
repression repels demands emerging from the id and 
disavowal wards off undesirable "idea" emerging from the 
external world. 
The First Approach to the Meaning of Denial 
Giving the meaning of disavowal caused another 
problematic issue for Freud. The problem centered around 
two words, denial (Verleugnung) and negation (Verneingung). 
At the beginning he used both terms interchangeably as a 
defense against the emergence of undesirable memories. He 
says, "the deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for 
the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the 
nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows 
even in reproducing them."41 We must not be puzzled with 
this. Stored memories originally come from the external 
world in the process of participation with this world as 
well as in the process of introjection. Later on, 
Verneingung came to be negation rather than disavowal. 
41. S. Freud, Standard Edition, V. II, p. 289. 
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Freud gives us a very penetrating example. In analyzing 
the dream of one of his patients, Freud says, 
You ask who this person in the dream can be. It 
is not my mother! We amend this to: 'so it is 
his mother.' In our interpretation we take the 
liberty of disregarding the negation and of pick-
ing out the subject matter alone of the associa-
tion. 42 
undoubtedly, this does not seem to be perfectly clear. At 
least we know that there are some obscurities. Let us 
continue attempting to clarify. R.S. Zwi Werplowski in his 
"Denial and Religion" interprets both Verlungnung and 
verneingung as a "double aspect of denial." But this does 
not clarify the difficulty of Freud's usage. Let us have 
another attempt to put the pieces together. 
Now, we need to excuse ourselves for the repetitions 
and the overlapping of the material discussed. This would 
put the ambiguities as well as the clarity into more 
definite perspective. Let us look at the two major 
meanings of disavowal. Firstly, in most general terms, 
according to Freud, disavowal in a psychotic state of mind 
refers to a reaction of the ego to an intolerable external 
reality. This is supplemented by "hallucinatory psychosis" 
as a reaction to a loss which external reality affirms. 
Let us call this disavowal A. 
42. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XIX, p. 235. 
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secondly, disavowal refers to the reaction of the 
little boy to the absence of the male genital in a woman. 
we know how children react to their first 
impression of the absence of a penis. They 
disavow the fact and believe that they do see a 
penis all the same. They gloss over the contra-
diction between observation and preconception by 
telling themselves that the penis is still small 
and will grow bigger presently; and they then 
come to the emotionally significant conclusion 
that after all the penis had at least been there 
before and been taken away afterwards.43 
In "Fetishism," Freud maintains that denial is a defense 
mechanism operative in the fetishist. He describes it as 
follows, "the fetish is a substitute for the penis .... The 
fetish is precisely disguised to preserve it from extinc-
tion.1144 We notice that this disavowal emerges in 
different proportions in psychosis as well as in neurosis. 
Let us call this disavowal B. 
Thirdly, another meaning of disavowal emerges in 
Freud's literature as distinct from the notion of 
repression. This includes the "disavowal of perceptions." 
Let us return to the previous theme that the childish ego, 
under the domination of the real world, gets rid of 
43. Ibid., p. 144. 
44. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XXI, p. 152. 
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undesirable instinctual demands by a defense mechanism 
called repressions. 
we will now supplement this by further asserting 
that, during the same period of life, the ego 
often enough finds itself in the position of 
fending off some demand from the external world 
which it feels distressing and that this is 
effected by means of a disavowal of the 
perceptions which brings to knowledge this demand 
from reality. 45 
Let us call this disavowal c. Leo Goldberger explains this 
kind of denial: 
the ego may be said to have at its disposal a 
screening apparatus which can reduce a percept to 
a signal. Should the original evoke pain or 
anxiety beyond a certain threshold the percept 
does not achieve conscious awareness--it is 
denied or somehow blocked .... What specifically 
is denied? The total impact of the percept, 
i.e., both the cognitive and its inseparable 
intensity component, the affects.46 
This blocking out or warding off the percepts is called by 
45. s. Freud, Standard Edition, V, XXIII, pp. 203-204. 
46. Leo Goldberger, "The Concept and Mechanisms of Denial: 
A Selective Overview." From The Denial of Stress, ed. 
by Shlomo Breznitz (New York: International University 
Press, 1983), p. 85. 
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Edith Jacobson in her article "Denial and Repression" a 
form of amnesia. In a metaphorical sense she pictures it 
as putting this memory or percept behind an "iron curtain." 
so, what Freud calls repression as a reaction to ward off 
reality or attempting at flight from reality is now called 
by Freud disavowal, i.e., in our own language disavowal c. 
Let us have an example of this category of disavowal. 
Freud gives us this, 
Let us suppose, then, that a child's ego is under 
the sway of a powerful instinctual demand which 
it is accustomed to satisfy and that it is 
suddenly frightened by an experience which 
teaches it that the continuance of this 
satisfaction will result in an almost intolerable 
real danger. It must now decide either to 
recognize the real danger, give way to it and 
renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or disavow 
reality and make itself believe that there is no 
reason for fear, so that it may be able to 
maintain the satisfaction.47 
So what can we learn from these three categories of 
disavowal? Disavowal A is an extreme kind of disavowal. 
It is schizophrenia itself. The schizophrenic does not 
"displace" reality as in the case of the fetish: he or she 
"replaces" reality by hallucination. The neurotic such as 
47. s. Freud, Standard Edition, v. XXIII, p. 275. 
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the fetishist (disavowal B) has an "initial obedience" to 
reality, at the same time an "initial flight" in a symbolic 
waY• Freud means that the neurotic ignores reality and the 
psychotic disavows it. In disavowal B the perceptual 
relation to reality remains open while in psychosis the 
perceptual relation to reality is "closed," and, 
consequently, hallucination takes place as a means to match 
with the new created reality and also as an attempt to 
restore the lost reality. Disavowal c is a stage necessary 
for developmental process by which the child learns how to 
live or to mediate between the external and the internal. 
The second Approach to the Meaning of Disavowal 
In the previous sections we showed how important the 
theme of schizophrenia is to Freud. It is important 
because through his investigation of this extreme mental 
sickness he was able to draw the line of demarcation 
between the conscious and the unconscious, the relation 
between ego and the object, the internal and the external 
reality and the importance of the ego as synthesizer and as 
an agent of participation between the internal and the 
external world. 
In this section we are going to face more ambiguities 
especially when the notion of lesser psychosis is taken 
into consideration. The line of demarcation is blurred. 
This should not be strange if we consider the zig-zag, 
circular way of Freud's thinking. We shall try to reach a 
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sufficient conclusion. 
schizophrenia as an "id~e-limite" could be considered 
as a general description of regression to the auto-erotic 
stage which is accompanied by hallucination as an attempt 
to recapture what is lost. The question is: Is there a 
psychotic state which could be considered as psychotic, but 
not exactly schizophrenic? The answer is yes. It is 
paranoia. What are the major differences between 
schizophrenia and paranoia? There are, according to Freud, 
three major differences: Firstly, in paranoia unlike 
schizophrenia, the relation with the external world is 
retained. Secondly, the mechanism by which paranoia 
manifests itself is by projection on the external world. 
In schizophrenia hallucination takes place. Thirdly, 
paranoia refers to a regression to the narcissistic stage; 
schizophrenia refers to a regression to the auto-erotic 
stage. It seems that the paranoic regresses to a stage 
which is the next on the scale of the human development. 
Having in mind the differences between schizophrenia 
and paranoia we are able to draw out the notion of 
regression as common to both, but to a lesser degree in 
paranoia. Considering that the paranoic keeps his or her 
relation to the external world as in neurosis, we come out 
with this question: Can we consider paranoia as a less 
extreme psychosis or an extreme neurosis? As to the 
distinction Freud's text is not clear. Let us try to dig 
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for what could be implicit in Freud's text. 
In order to get into the implicit level it is 
worthwhile to refer to some of Freud's remarks already 
mentioned in this chapter. Freud maintains that our 
absolute detachment from reality could not really happen. 
Hallucination in schizophrenia is considered by Freud as an 
"attempt" to regain what was lost. What we learn from this 
is that an "absolute" detachment from reality is only a 
possibility. Referring to his ego psychology it is obvious 
that the ego does not reach the limit of an "absolute" 
detachment from reality. In other words, there is always a 
part of the "ego" that remains aware, "the disavowal is 
always supplemented by an acknowledgment. 11 48 In his 
interpretation of Freud, Leo Goldberger puts it, "Denial is 
not an all-or-none affair. 11 49 
Another issue we would like to raise is the notion of 
"leakage." In relation to this notion we have in mind 
dreams. As mentioned before, dreams are "psychotic" 
manifestations of the psyche. It is a particular disavowal 
of the external world taking into consideration that a part 
of the ego does not "sleep." Although dreams have 
"psychotic" reactions, yet, they could not be considered as 
a disease of equal pathology as schizophrenia. They are 
less schizophrenic or less psychotic considering that 
48. Ibid., p. 204. 
49. Goldberger, p. 87. 
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a:t>solute psychosis "perhaps never" happens. The point we 
would like to make is that leakage happens in degrees. Let 
us see what Donald P. Spence says in "The Paradox of 
oenial." 
Denial is never complete. It has a partial 
effect; only when by allowing some threatening in 
formation to register can it orient the person 
where not to look. This information is variously 
elaborated and transformed, it can be mixed with 
the subject's own fantasies, and can often 
produce a supposed reality which is more 
terrifying than the actual reality •.•. It is 
this very "leakage" which keeps the mechanism in 
operation. If all input were blocked--if denial 
were complete--the mechanism would probably cease 
operating. What seems to happen is that a finely 
adjusted feedback loop is created which 
determines just how much negative information is 
permitted to slip though. If too much leakage is 
allowed, the person becomes anxious and denial is 
increased; with too little leakage, denial is 
discontinued and the person is exposed to threats 
which he cannot tolerate, at which point the 
denial comes back into operation.50 
50. D. Spence, "The Paradox of Denial," from The Denial of 
Stress, ed. by s. Breznitz (New York: International 
University Press, 1983), p. 103. 
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W}lat we can deduce from this is that the notion of the 
nieakage" explains that the human psyche operates within 
oscillating limits. This is to say that there could be an 
extreme psychosis, less extreme psychosis, extreme 
neurosis, less extreme neurosis, a healthy person, less 
healthy and less healthier, etc •• Referring to the 
function of the ego, the ego might have good control over 
the other two agents, or less control, or a minimum 
control, etc. It seems that getting into the limits, it 
would be hard to draw a sharp and clear distinction between 
the degrees of denial. An absolute manifestation of one 
phenomenon of the psyche seems to be impossible or rare. 
It is no wonder that Freud's psychology is the psychology 
of "disruptive powers"; each agent protects itself against 
its own forces as well as it protects itself against other 
attached forces. That said, the overlapping 
characteristics between psychosis and neurosis are 
overwhelming. Consequently, ambiguity emerges, and this is 
definitely articulated with Freud's thought, i.e., there is 
always an unknown to be dealt with, there is always an 
absent-presence to consider, there is a search for what has 
been lost; and finally, there are beliefs to be adopted and 
beliefs to be modified. It is the dialectic itself and the 
synthesis is an ongoing process. This confirms what the 
poet says: "As long as he on earth shall live/ So long I 
make no prohibition./ While man's desires and aspirations 
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stir,/ He cannot choose but err" (Goethe's Faust, Part I, 
SC· I) • 
gonclusion 
Freud describes psychoanalysis as "intellectual hell." 
This is due to its emphasis on studying the inner 
interrelated levels of the mind. In this context, prior to 
explicating the notion of denial, Freud had to define the 
two fundamental notions of psychoanalysis: the conscious 
and the unconscious. The latter is explained in relation 
to schizophrenia which is a mental disease by which the 
link between the "word presentation" and the "thing 
presentation" is to a certain degree - extreme or less 
extreme - disrupted or disconnected. The ego, the reality 
testing agent, loses much of its contact with the external 
reality; a reality which Freud gives a crucial importance 
to the development of the person as a being who 
participates in the world. Freud calls the defense 
mechanism by which a person "wards off" external reality 
"disavowal" or "denial". 
But due to the complexities which underlie the notion 
of denial, Freud's investigations led us to believe that 
denial is never complete. This is to say that denial of 
the external reality is a matter of degree: extreme as it 
is the case with schiozophrenia (denial A), less extreme as 
it is the case of the neurotic fetish (denial B), and the 
denial of the young boy of the absence of the penis in the 
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female which is considered by Freud as natural in the 
development of the person in this particular stage (denial 
C) • This matter-of-degree in denying the external reality 
_ as shown in denial A and denial B - is related to the 
inability of the ego to mediate between the inner world and 
the external world. This shows that although the ego is 
"feeble" it continues to assume its power. In other words, 
the ego is a major power in the process of homeostasis 
which affirms the perspective that denial is always 
accompanied by a certain degree of acknowledgement. 
If denial is warding off external reality, then the 
question that will be addressed is: Can we consider denial 
as vice? This question will be answered in the next 
chapter. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER TWO 
That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet 
--Shakespeare 
Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc II 
Plus 9a change plus c'est la meme chose 
--French proverb 
The major question to be answered in this chapter is: 
could we consider denial as vice in Freud's literature? 
The answer is yes. But, this is not enough, for 
clarification is needed about why denial could be 
considered as vice. To answer this question one finds that 
some difficulties may block this investigation. Why? The 
answer lies in Freud's attitude to ethics and morality. As 
Heinz Hartzmann expresses it, in his life-long 
psychoanalytic investigations, morality was not that close 
to Freud's heart. "What is moral is self-evident"l as 
Freud used to quote F.T. Visher. 
But this should not be considered as a blocking wall 
against the purpose of our investigation. The attainment 
of a growing knowledge about a certain writer is not 
1. Heinz Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New 
York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1960), 
p. 14. 
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restricted to our reading of his or her explicit side; but 
bY reading what is between the lines. Leo Strauss 
expresses it as follows: 
The only presentations of an author's views which 
can be accepted as true are those ultimately 
borne out by his own explicit statements. 
[This] .•. principle is decisive; it seems to 
exclude a priori from the sphere of human 
knowledge such views of earlier writers as are 
indicated exclusively between the lines. For if 
an author does not tire of asserting on every 
page of his book that g is Q, but indicates 
between the lines that g is not Q, the modern 
historian will still demand explicit evidence 
showing that the author believed g not Q. Such 
evidence cannot possibly be forthcoming, and the 
modern historian wins his argument: he can 
dismiss any reading between the lines as 
arbitrary guess work, or, if he is lazy, he will 
accept it as intuitive knowledge. 2 
In this regard, we pose another question: how do we 
investigate and support our argument? What is really 
needed is the understanding of Freud's psychoanalytic 
language from its own perspective as it emerged in our 
2. Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing 
(Glenceo, IL: Free Press, 1952), pp. 31-32. 
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century as a language in its own right. Paul Ricoeur 
affirms this point of view. He says, 
It seems to me there is an area today where all 
philosophical investigations cut across one 
another -- the area of language ... in search of a 
comprehensive philosophy of language to account 
for the multiple functions of the human act of 
signifying and for their interrelationships. We 
have at our disposal a symbolic logic, exegetical 
science, anthropology.and psychoanalysis and 
perhaps for the first time, we are able to 
encompass in a single question the problem of the 
unification of human discourse.3 
This quotation shows another important notion which is the 
interrelationships of the multiple functions of language as 
they pave the way to the "unification of human discourse.'' 
So, discourse is what we aim at, discourse between the 
language of Freud and Aristotle. Considering the approach, 
what is implicit in Freud's writing concerning denial could 
come to the surface as we take Aristotle's definition of 
vice as our starting point. Why Aristotle? F. Foot in her 
book Virtues and Vices gives us the answer. She says, 
In spite of this recent work, it is best when 
considering the virtues and vices go back to 
3. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. D. Savage. 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 
3 • 
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Aristotle and Aquinas .•• It is certain ••. that the 
most systematic account is found in Aristotle.4 
This is also not easy to tackle. Comparing a 
psychanalytic notion to a philosophical notion would seem 
to uncover undefinable ambiguities. In order to conquer 
these prospective ambiguities, let us try to find out what 
were the common places upon which both Freud and Aristotle 
depended upon. Finding these common places will help our 
investigation to bridge the gap. 
Trying to bridge this gap, one must bear in mind that 
Freud never meant to divorce himself from the intellectual 
as well as the mythological principles of the "Greco-Roman" 
traditions. This is unquestionably apparent in having the 
myth of Oedipus as the heart of his psychoanalytic 
discoveries which he based on the scientific principles and 
traditions of the western civilizations. That said, 
finding the common places between Aristotle and Freud will 
help us in understanding the intentional implicit meaning 
which underlies the difference between the language of 
Freud's psychoanalysis and the language of Aristotle's 
philosophy. 
The Common Places 
1) Man as a Social Being. The proverbial statement by 
Aristotle "Man is a social animal" is enough to state his 
4. Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and other Essays in 
Moral Philosophy (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1978), p. 1. 
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position. But this is not enough considering that 
Aristotle's ethics aims at the "good" which he defines as 
h . h th' . 115 "that at w 1c every 1ng aims. To attain the "good," 
Aristotle gives "political science ... the ruling science" as 
the science which "uses the other sciences concerned with 
action, and moreover legislates what must be done and what 
avoided. Hence its end will include the ends of the other 
sciences, and so will be the human good. 11 6 In this 
respect, the human good is not only the good of the 
individual but also the good of the city. This is to say, 
"the good is the same for a city as for an individual, 
still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more 
complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it is 
satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an 
individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and 
preserve it for a people and for cities. 11 7 So what 
Aristotle seems to say is that the good of the human being 
is attained only in a city, i.e., in a society. In other 
words, there is no human being without a society; and being 
superior to the individual, society dictates law, forms the 
character of the individual and allows the integration of 
its values and norms within the individual person. In this 
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin. 
(Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), Bk 1, 1, 
1094a. 
6. Ibid. I Bk 1, 2, 1094b. 
7. Ibid. 
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sense there is, to a larger extent, an articulation between 
the individual and his or her society. 
society is no less important to Freud. In the first 
chapter, it was discussed how much Freud took pain to prove 
the importance of the external world; a world which is 
responsible for the differentiation of the ego as well as 
to the formation of the superego. This does not stop here. 
According to Freud, the human experience is deeply rooted 
in the unavoidable contact between the infant and his 
parents, especially the mother, and later the individual's 
desire to attain the "lost object." In other words, the 
essential task of civilization is to unite the individual 
with society. In his book, Civilization and its 
Discontents, Freud says, 
This task is one of uniting separate individuals 
into a community bound together by libidinal 
ties •.. the integration of separate individuals 
into a human group, and in the other case the 
creation of a unified group out of many 
individuals. 11 8 
Moreover, Freud in his essay "A Note upon the 'Mystic 
Writing-Pad,'" in which he discusses a model by which the 
psyche operates, shows how the ever "fresh" "receptive" 
psyche is open to the stimulation from the external world 
8. s. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. 
James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 
pp. 96-97. 
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d at the same time retains traces of the past an 
iDpressions. These traces are preserved in the id which 
activate themselves by disrupting the ego and by 
threatening the social "oughts" incorporated by the 
superego. There is a circular movement from the outside to 
the inside and then from the inside to the outside. 
Furthermore, in the clinical setting the inherent social 
dimension is also present. One can unmistakably observe 
that the client does not only reach the level of self-
understanding, but also, he or she is understood by the 
therapist, i.e., by another person. 
The social dimension in the life of the person is 
clearly evident in both Freud and Aristotle. It is evident 
in the sense that the person is a social being who 
articulates, incorporates and develops only in a culture. 
Whatever happens within the life of the individual, its 
social dimension remains the source and the dynamic factor 
in the formation of his or her character. 
This similarity between Freud and Aristotle is clear. 
But, as it appears in his Civilization and its Discontents, 
Freud, unlike Aristotle, perceives society and culture as 
the source of neurosis. For Aristotle the "good of man" is 
attained in the city state. But Freud has a "tragic" sense 
of life which originates in an attitude of "negation," as 
Jacques Lacan explains it, resulting from the a "loss" of 
the "bond with the mother." In other words, it is a form 
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of "castration" or a separation from what was "all" to the 
infant. Hence, later in life the individual fights a lost 
battle in attaining this "lost object." So, in contrast to 
Aristotle, for Freud the attainment of the absolute "good" 
is prohibited by society. According to Lacan, the 
attainment of the desired object remains within the 
framework of desire. He calls it "manque-a-etre. 119 
Referring to what was already discussed, we can say 
that Freud and Aristotle present us with the two sides of 
the same coin. Freud maintains that society is a necessary 
unavoidable tragedy in which the good is desired, but never 
attained. Aristotle, on the other hand, maintains that 
society is a necessity to achieve the good as well as to 
achieve happiness. 
Desire 
As shown above, for Aristotle the "good" of the human 
person is attained in the city through participation. 
Considering the individual a participant in his or her 
society implies that for Aristotle ethics is not something 
over there. It is incorporated within the person and 
actualized in a form of "activity." Also, to be a 
participant in a culture, a person, to a large extent, 
holds himself or herself back from wishing or desiring too 
much. A desire should be deliberated on. In Book III of 
9. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1973), p. 29. 
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the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains how a person 
gets to a final decision: 
we have found, then, that what we decide to do is 
whatever action among those up to us we 
deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also 
decision will be deliberative desire to do an 
action that is up to us; for when we have judged 
(that it is right] as a result of deliberation, 
our desire to do it expresses our wish.lo 
What we notice in this quotation is that desire is 
connected with deliberation which leads us to assume that 
Aristotle does not imply any unconscious processes as Freud 
does. This is to say that upon deliberation one is 
conscious of his or her desire. Freud adds a new 
dimension, i.e., the dimension of the unconscious which 
embodies the id as "desiring," as Philip Rieff calls in his 
book Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. Rieff describes this 
desiring id as "indestructible" forces which knows "no 
values, no good and evil, no morality"; a "primitive 
chaos," "blind," "natural will" which "desires" what the 
conscious mind is ignorant of. In other words, the 
unconscious id is the "larger sphere 11 ll which out of its 
"fertility" the two other agents the ego and the superego 
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 3, 1113a. 
11. Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 
35. 
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emerge under the influence of the external world. Freud 
describes this unconscious instinctual id as a mob. He 
says, 
woe, if they should be set loose! The throne 
would be overturned and the ruler trampled under 
foot. Society is aware of this -- and will not 
allow the topic to be mentioned.12 
Let us try to relate what is implied in both 
perspectives. For Aristotle we desire what is in 
accordance with deliberation. For Freud we desire more 
than what is in accordance with the deliberation of the ego 
and more than what culture allows. But we must not forget 
Aristotle's perspective that a human being is like any 
other animal. In De Anima he insists on the governing 
powers of the human passions and desires; and in his 
ethics, he also insists on the building of virtues in order 
to organize our inner space and act with a sense of 
"proportion" and coordination. So in this context, Freud 
and Aristotle speak a similar and an assimilable language. 
As Aristotle advocates a sense of proportion in the 
persons' life, so does Freud. Freud advocates that this 
"mob ..• eager for enjoyment and destruction has to be held 
12. Henry and Yela Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and 
the Superego: Some Current Thoughts About Freud's 
Cultural Concepts." From The Psychology of 
Adolescence, ed. Aaron Esman (New York: International 
Universities Press, Inc., 1975), p. 497. 
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down •.• by a prudent superior class." 1 3 Then, what else 
other than prudence would come up with a sense of 
• I proportion. 
~a son 
Aristotle, the child of his time, puts reason as that 
faculty which distinguishes the human being from living 
things. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, he clearly 
states his position: 
For living is apparently shared with plants, but 
what we are looking for is the special function 
of a human being; hence we should set aside the 
life of nutrition and growth. The life next in 
order is some sort of life of sense-perception; 
but this too is apparently shared, with horse, ox 
and every animal. The remaining possibility, 
then, is some sort of life of action a.£ the part 
that has reason.14 
Again, in his qualification of those who study ethics, 
Aristotle argues that a youth should not be a student of 
"political science;" "since he tends to be guided by his 
feelings, his study will be futile and useless; for its end 
is action, not knowledge.n15 What Aristotle says is that 
"political science," the science which builds the good 
13. Ibid. 
14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 1, 7, 1098a. 
15. Ibid., Bk 1, 4, 1095a. 
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citizen, is a study guided by reason whose end is knowledge 
put into action. He continues, "If_, however, we are guided 
bY reason in forming our desires and in acting, then this 
knowledge will be of great benefit. 11 16 
In the last chapter of his book, The Future of an 
Illusion, Freud is no less an advocate of reason than 
Aristotle. "I stand for the claims of reason ... , 11 17 he 
says. For Freud, reason is not omnipotent. Reason is 
weak, but persistent. Its voice is "a soft one ... but it 
does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Finally, 
after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. 11 18 
In this regard, Aristotle and Freud insist that building a 
life according to reason is not an easy accomplishment. 
This is to say, it is a struggle between the "irrational" 
and the "rational." Being a struggle, a virtuous life, 
according to Aristotle, is not an easy thing to attain; it 
has to be developed by practice. In chapter 31 of his A 
History of Philosophy, F. Copleston, S.J., says, that in 
the process of making a choice the "moral struggle" is 
evident in Aristotle's writings on ethics. This choice is 
defined as "desireful reason" or "reasonable desire. 11 19 
16. Ibid. 
17. S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. J. 
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), p. 51. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New 
York: Image Books, 1962), Vol. I, Part II, p. 81. 
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.Although Freud and Aristotle are considered to be 
rationalists in their approach, yet one must be cautious in 
attributing to them the qualifications attributed to some 
other rationalists as shown in Tom Stoppard's play The 
~umpers, i.e., rigid self control and rigid obedience to 
rules which do not allow the "articulation" between the 
rational and the irrational. Freud and Aristotle are 
"common sense" people. But what is common sense? J.H. 
Randall and J. Buchler define common sense in its non-
technical usage as "good sense," "native shrewdness," and 
"a certain sense of practicality or rudimentary 
intelligence." In its philosophical sense they define it 
as "sense that is common." 
Its source is experience of the most fundamental 
and pervasive character, the minimal biological, 
social, and psychological experience of man. All 
that is necessary for its acquisition is the 
exercise of the sense and the memory, and the 
simplest kind of reasoning. Common sense 
knowledge is acquired by us willy-nilly, and not 
in virtue of any method. It results not from 
infusing but from mere living .... Thus common 
sense is the starting-point of all inquiry. We 
may, by the employment of deliberate methods, 
rise above it, but we can never dispense with 
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't 20 1 • 
this quotation we can infer four important notions: 
rroro 
character, experience, reasoning and living. If we combine 
all of these four notions together we find that what 
underlies them is the act of living. Isn't this what Freud 
and Aristotle try to convey to us? How? Let us start with 
Aristotle. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle never meant by 
possessing the virtues a kind of abstract way of thinking, 
but experiencing what is good for the human being in 
"activity." He says that it is much better to be brave 
then to know about bravery. In other word, the main 
purpose of ethics is the developing of human character in 
"concrete action," like "acting well." How to act well? 
Aristotle does not give us general rules. To act well 
depends on our upbringing, on our virtues and on the models 
we set for ourselves. Aristotle gives Pericles as an 
example. To act well entails experience; experience that 
may change our lives in an act of "conversion." But how 
does one know that it is the right experience? The answer 
is, as Michael Novak puts it, by "discernment." He 
interprets Aristotle by saying that discernment cannot be 
taught, it stems from the person's experience: It is an 
experience which is developed as the poet develops his 
20. J. H. Randall & J. Buchler, Philosophy: An 
Introduction (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1971), 
pp. 46-4 7. 
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poetry and the artist develops his art and "that we make of 
our lives an 'art of action .•• , 11 21 i.e. acting well at the 
right time and in the right place. Therefore, according to 
Aristotle, the practice of rational decisions in our 
everyday life is akin to art. 
How is this implied in Freud's literature? In The Ego 
and the Id, Freud described the ego -- the rational agent 
of the psyche, as a shrewd diplomat. It represents reason 
and common-sense. 
The ego uses borrowed forces ... so, in the same 
way the ego is in the habit of transforming the 
id's will into action as if it were its 
own22 •.• in the matter of action the ego's 
position is like that of a constitutional 
monarch, without whose sanction no law can be 
passed but who hesitates long before imposing his 
veto on any measure put forward by parliament .... 
All the experiences of life that originate from 
without enrich the ego; the id, however, is its 
second external world, which it strives to bring 
into subjection to itself. It withdraws libido 
from the id and transforms the object cathexes 
21. Michael Novak, from a class lecture. Post-Doctoral 
Carnegie Institute in Philosophy of Religion, Notre 
Dame University, 27 June, 1969. 
22. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (New 
York: The Norton Library: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960), p. 
15. 
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of the id into ego structures ••• [the ego] is not 
only a helper to the id; it is also a submissive 
slave who courts his master's love •.. tried to 
remain on good terms with the id; it clothes the 
id's unconscious commands with the Pcs 
[Preconscious] rationalization, it pretends that 
the id is showing obedience to the admonitions of 
reality, even when in fact it is remaining 
obstinate and unyielding; it disguises the id's 
conflicts with reality and, if possible, its 
conflicts with the superego, too.23 In its 
position midway between the id and reality, it 
only too often yields to the temptation to become 
sycophantic, opportunist and lying, like a 
politician who sees the truth but wants to keep 
his place in popular favor.24 
It does not take much to observe that underlying the 
functioning of the ego there is discernment and evaluation 
of a certain impinging situation. The ego weighs 
situations and decides which is the best way to keep an 
unbroken relationship with the external world. If the ego 
lies -- a "noble lie" it is only because of the 
necessity for adaptation rather than only the necessity for 
integration. In other word, the ego, sometimes falls sick, 
23. Ibid., p. 46. 
24. Ibid. 
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deceives itself and deceives the other two agents only, 
paradoxically speaking, to preserve itself. It is a way of 
11 5 avoir vivre" or the possession of the "art of living." 
In this respect, there are two important similarities 
between Freud and Aristotle. 1) Both do not give us rules 
on what to do or what not to do. They provide us with an 
"operative structure" which we try to use the best we can. 
2) The matter of choice is an art revealed in a certain 
style, tact and manners. As the ego falls sick in order to 
preserve itself, so it is with some ethical choices in 
Aristotle's ethics. He says that it would be, sometimes, 
better to err on the deficient side rather than to err on 
the excessive side. For both, a person is capable of 
prudent and adaptive mistakes. Freud calls this the "self 
confidence of health." 
For more clarification, let us see how discernment and 
this kind of diplomacy reveal themselves in a clinical 
situation. Freud, according to Joseph Rychlack, was never 
only concerned with insightful intellectualization. What 
Freud is really concerned with is the fusion of insight 
with activity. So the insight he has on the activities of 
ego in relation to the id and the superego, manifests 
itself in the therapeutic situation. How? Firstly, 
insight is joined after interpretation and after the 
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"reenactment11 25 of the past repressed experiences, e.g., 
the act of transference. Secondly, in order to outdo the 
past repressed fixation, oftentimes, the psychoanalyst, 
according to P. Rieff, acts as the ego of the client, while 
the client becomes an id coming to consciousness.26 
Thirdly, as Freud describes the diplomatic function of the 
ego, the analyst, oftentimes, allies with the id of the 
client in order to bring it to consciousness. In one of 
his letters to Fliess, Freud metaphorically says that he 
acts as "the devil" in order to get out the demons hidden 
in the patient's breast. In other words, he directs the 
demons out to consciousness. In other instances the 
analyst becomes the superego of the client, i.e., the 
prototype of the father. When and how the analyst take 
these acts depends on his or her power of discernment. In 
this regard, reason is a, discerning faculty and a 
synthesizer of thoughts, actions and desires. 
The very nature of reason is a guarantee that it 
would not fail to concede to human emotions and 
to all that is determined by the accurate 
position to which they are entitled.27 
25. Joseph F. Rychlack, Introduction to Personality and 
Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1981) I P• 95. 
26. Philip Rieff, The Mind of the Moralist (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 35. 
27. Heinz Hartman, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, p. so. 
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character 
- Freud describes character as what is " ••. based on the 
memory-traces of our impressions; and, moreover, the 
impressions which have had the greatest effect on us 
those of our earliest youth -- are precisely the ones which 
scarcely ever become conscious.n2S Regardless of how or 
why a certain character is formed, both Aristotle in his 
Ethics and Freud in his typology, give a crucial concern to 
character. For both of them, there is an ethical component 
which contributes to the formation of character; namely, 
the internal as well as the external social world. Being 
locked in this internal-external struggle, the person, in 
order to possess an adaptable and an integrative character 
must exercise self-control and learn through experience the 
act of discernment. Without these two qualities the person 
falls, according to Aristotle, into excessive or deficient 
personality traits, and according to Freud, a person is 
bound to be controlled by a personality type unconsciously 
regulated by a regressive and fixative behavior brought 
about by an unsatisfied early level of human development. 
In spite of the differences in language, both Freud and 
Aristotle give us certain character traits to which each 
one gives different names. In his book On Moral Character, 
Jody Palmour provides us with a table showing us how 
28. s. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James 
Strachey (New York: Basic Books, Inc./The Hograth 
Press, Ltd., 1965), p. 578. 
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different names are given to the same character traits:29 
Aristotle 
Generous 
Miserly 
Practical 
Extravagant 
Freud 
Genital 
Anal 
oral-Aggressive 
oral-Receptive 
we will elaborate on these in due course. It is worth 
noting that due to the "dialectic approach" to the study of 
the human mind, neither Freud nor Aristotle, ever isolates 
one character trait from another. They both believe in the 
coexistence of different character traits. Psychologically 
speaking, two positive and negative contents could coexist. 
Those who have some fixation on their anal stage which 
includes "fecal interest" may develop two opposite 
coexisting characteristics: stinginess and cleanliness. 
For Aristotle, a clever person could be courageous (a 
positive characteristic) as well as stingy or exploitative 
(a negative characteristic). 
But, in spite of this coexistence of negative and 
positive characteristics, one is capable of altering one's 
life into a more favorable way; for Aristotle by building 
the virtues, and for Freud, by insight and by undoing the 
"libidinal fixation" on early stages of the person's 
childhood. According to P. Rieff, Freud's therapeutic aim 
is to build two important virtues: the virtue of prudence 
29. Jody Palmour, On Moral Character, (Washington, D.C.: 
The Archon Institute for Leadership Development, 
1986)' p. 158. 
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d the virtue of compromise.
30 Since it is a continuous 
an 
struggle, every highly competent and virtuous person may 
have some doubts and fears. What is really crucial is that 
a competent and virtuous person is able to "suppress" or 
"control" these doubts whenever it is discerned as 
necessary, thanks to their "normal" struggle. so; a 
character, as Jody Palmour defines, refers to 
The particular form of development of a person's 
moral and emotional powers which dispose him to 
excessive, deficient or appropriate responses; 
developed through the interaction between one's 
consitutional capacities or gifts and 
environment, opportunities and pressures; while 
relatively fixed and marked as an adaptation and 
strategy toward life, one's character can become 
either more or less virtuous.31 
The last part of this quotation leads us to the next common 
place. 
As-a-Matter-of-Degree 
In the first chapter we referred to the idea that 
extreme schizophrenia as a psychosis is an "idee-limite." 
This led us to the opinion that in Freud's literature the 
line of demarcation between a schizophrenic denial and a 
neurotic denial (the fetish) is only a matter of degree. 
30. Rieff, p. 61. 
31. Ibid. p. 339. 
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The former has an extreme denial of the external world, the 
1atter has a less extreme denial of the external world. 
This is also applicable as shown before, to other cases of 
psychosis and neurosis. Now let us see how as-a-matter-of-
degree is shown in Aristotle's ethics. 
Let us prove our point by considering what Aristotle 
says about a brave person. The test of a brave person is 
in a "life-threatening" situation. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics we notice that Aristotle uses the superlative in 
order to prove that a certain act is the bravest. This 
means that this act is considered to include more courage 
than another act. 
Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern 
the brave person? Surely the most frightening; 
for no one stands firmer against terrifying 
conditions. Now death is most frightening of 
all, since it is a boundary, and when someone is 
dead nothing beyond it seems either good or bad 
for him any more. Still not even death in all 
conditions, e.g., on the sea or in sickness, 
seems to be the brave person's concern. In what 
conditions, then, is death his concern? Surely 
in the finest condition. Now such deaths are 
those in war, since they occur in the greatest 
and finest danger; .•• Hence someone is called 
brave to the fullest extent if he is intrepid in 
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facing a fine death and the immediate dangers 
that bring death -- and this above all true of 
the dangers of war.32 
prom this quotation we can assume that a person who dies on 
the battlefield for the sake of the city state is the 
bravest. This also means that facing death in the 
battlefield is braver than facing death when a person is 
diseased. Why? It is because on the battlefield a person 
"shows greater prowess against that which threatens him. 11 33 
Again, we notice the superlative and the comparative tense 
which means that as-a-matter-of-degree is another element 
in Freud's as well as in Aristotle's literature. 
These common places prove that Freud's literature is 
assimilable into Aristotle's literature. These will help 
our investigation by uncovering the implicit side of 
Freud's notion of denial as vice. But before coming to a 
conclusion, we need to define vice as it is shown in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. So, the question is: What 
is vice according to Aristotle? 
Aristotle identifies vice with that which "ruins." It 
ruins because it is an "activity" exercised in either 
"excessive" or in a "deficient" practice: "For both 
excessive and deficient exercises ruin strength; and 
likewise, too much or too little eating or drinking ruins 
32. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 7, 1116a. 
33. Jody Palmour, On Moral Character, p. 98. 
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h 1134 healt ••• It is contrary to virtue which 
11 ••. like 
nature, is better and more exact than any craft, it will 
also aim at what is intermediate. 11 35 i.e. the "mean." But 
one should not be misled by the word "excess" or "extreme. 11 
for virtue, according to Aristotle, is an extreme. In 
other words, virtue is an "excellence," i.e., an extreme. 
Nicolai Hartmann provides us with this explanatory 
diagram. 36 
Goodness 
Deficiency Badness Excess 
F. Copleston S.J., explains this diagram. He says, 
34. 
35. 
36. 
The diagram illustrates the important point that 
virtue ... has a double position. (i) As regards 
the ontological dimension, it is an excellence or 
extreme. It is not as through virtue were a 
composition of vices from a valuational point of 
view, since, from this point of view, it stands 
in opposition to both vices, but it is 
nevertheless a mean from the ontological 
viewpoint, since it combines in itself both the 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 2, 3, 1104a. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 2, 6, 1106b. 
F. Copleston, A History of Philosoghy, citing Nicolai 
Hartmann, p. 79. 
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good points which, run to excess, constitute 
vices. For example, courage is not boldness 
alone, nor is it cool foresight alone, but a 
synthesis of both -- this character of a 
synthesis preventing courage from degenerating 
into the daring of the foolhardy man on the one 
hand or the prudence of the coward on the other 
hand. 37 
How similar this act of synthesis is to Freud's function of 
the ego as a synthesizer that was discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Considering this diagram we can say that vice is 
an excess or a deficiency on the "ontological" level. 
Considering the "ontological" basis, the question to be 
addressed is: how are the excess and the deficiency 
evident in Freud's account of what "ruins" the 
psychological harmony of the person? Let us start with the 
excesses and deficiencies of the functions of the three 
agents of the human psyche. 
Before getting into the excesses and deficiencies, one 
must bear in mind that in addition to its ever fresh 
receptivity, the psyche is ambivalent. How is this evident 
in Freud's opinion? In the Ego and the Id, Freud shows how 
fluctuating are the instincts: he says, 11 ••• That the 
satisfaction of one instinct can take the place of the 
37. Ibid. 
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satisfaction of another •••• " 38 This is also applicable to 
the three agents of the psyche. In other words, each agent 
has its oughts and intentions. As David Sachs explains 
this, "···between any person's emotions ..• and the causes 
thereof, there always obtain an actual proportionality or 
real appropriateness, no matter how incongruous those 
relations may appear to be."3 9 What do we understand from 
this? We understand that the agents of the psyche disrupt 
each other. It is an interplay between "urging and 
checking forces" as Freud describes it. Why are we 
alluding to this perspective? The reason is that due to 
the interrelatedness of the three agents of the psyche, one 
is unable to discuss one without discussing the other. 
More precisely, discussing the excess functioning of one 
agent explains the deficiency imposed on the other. This 
could be understandable if we have in mind how the process 
of "negation" and "repression" operate, a topic not to be 
discussed in this chapter. Our aim is to prove that excess 
or deficiency in the functioning of one of the three agents 
is destructive and brings "ruin" to the harmony of the 
psyche, by giving way for the two others to press the 
expression of their need, i.e., the "return of the 
38. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 34. 
39. David Sachs, "On Freud's Doctrine of Emotions.'' From 
Philosophical Essays on Freud. ed. by Richard Wollheim 
and James Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), p. 93. 
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d II represse · 
Now let us start with the super-ego and see how its 
excess or deficient functioning explains the excess or 
deficient functioning of the other two agents. The super-
ego has two major parts: Conscience and the ego-ideal. 
The former is described as follows: 
[the conscience] aggressiveness is introjected, 
internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to 
where it came from -- that is, it is directed towards 
his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of 
the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of 
the ego as super-ego and which now, in the form of 
'conscience' is ready to put into action against the 
ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would 
have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous 
individuals.40 
One cannot avoid noticing the paradoxical thinking in 
Freud's literature. Conscience is seen by Freud as an 
object-cathexis which has been replaced by an 
identification. It is the agency which "has a great share 
in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes 
an essential contribution towards building up what is 
called its 'character. 111 41 It is the agency which 
" ... gathers up from the influences of the environment the 
40. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 78. 
41. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 18. 
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demands which that environment makes upon the ego .•.• 11 42 
In other words, it is the "goal of ethics." A. Esman looks 
at it as a useful concept in " .•• categorizing the 
internalized model aspiration, goals and 'positive' 
values. 11 43 From these similar points of view we gather 
that the ego-ideal is both an agent in contact with the 
environment in order to sustain already internalized values 
and goals which are central to the formation of an ideal 
image. That said, the ego-ideal incorporates the virtues 
and values of a culture which become the corner stone for 
the person's actions, virtues and values which manifest 
themselves in a "constant habit" whose contents are 
"order," "moderation" and "constancy." Their dynamic 
quality is "perseverance." This is to say that virtue, 
i.e., values in action, is a conformity to an ideal 
standard accompanied by a capacity to act in a responsible 
way. 
So the super-ego has three important functions: 
First, a censor or a negator responsible for suppressing 
the aggressive destructive instinctual drives; Second, the 
carrier of moral virtues; third, a help in observing the 
person's responsibility towards oneself and towards 
society. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Aaron Esman, "Consolidation of the Ego Ideal in 
Contemporary Adolescence," from The Psychology of 
Adolescence. Ed. by A. Esman, p. 211. 
66 
considering these three functions of the superego, one 
must carry in mind that these functions should be 
manifested with moderation. An excess of these 
manifestations results in an inadequate suppression or 
repression of the instinctual demands. In his paper, "On 
the Theory of Hysterical Attack," Freud says, 
[the three functions of the superego] are all of 
them impressions that have failed to find an 
adequate discharge, either because the patient 
refuses to deal with them for fear of distressing 
mental conflicts or because (as in the case of 
sexual impressions) he is forbidden to do so by 
modesty or by social circumstances.44 
A crucial point should be observed in this quotation: 
"fear of distressing mental conflicts." What does this 
lead us to say? Reading between the lines we can assume 
that, firstly, the hysteric patient faces an ethical 
dilemma, i.e., it is right not to do it, or, it is wrong if 
I do it. Secondly, to be possessed by an excess of fear 
means that the patient lacks courage to do the right thing 
in the right time; or, we can say that the patient lacks 
the art of discernment to act in a proportionate way. 
Thirdly, the patient, to an extreme sense, is controlled by 
a tyrannous superego. Fourthly, the patient is locked 
44. Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, ed. J. Strachey (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), Volume 5, p. 30. 
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petween two extreme oughts: the oughts of the id and the 
oughts of the superego. Two "contrary wish fulfillments" 
which find their expression in a "single expression" i.e., 
the hysteric attack. 
More precisely, the virtue of "compromise" or the 
virtue of "prudence" is lacking in the hysteric patient. 
As implicitly implied, the virtue of "compromise" is an aid 
by which the person compromises between two extremes. 
Let's give an example: love and hate. Freud shows a 
suspicious attitude toward "altruistic love." He 
maintains, "A love that does not discriminate seems to me 
to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice 
to its objects; and secondly, not all men are worthy of 
love. 11 45 In this sense, an altruistic love hides "hate" 
which has an undeniable existence in the human psyche. so 
the virtue of "compromise" is strengthened by the virtue of 
prudence. This is to say a person knows well not to cast 
his or her pearls to swine. Oftentimes, in Freud's 
psychology the compromise arises in mechanisms such as 
sublimation, identification, etc., mechanisms by which 
human impulse have an adequate chance of discharge. 
What has already been discussed shows that extreme 
repression by the superego of the instinctual desires leads 
to a pathological physical or psychological discharge of 
these inhibited impulses which ruins the person's relation 
45. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXI, p. 102. 
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with himself or herself and with society. Now, the 
question to be addressed is: What happens when an extreme 
pennission is given to these instinctual impulses? 
previously it was mentioned that Freud calls these impulses 
11mobs" whose aim is destruction of both the individual and 
"civilization." Let us take our present days as a good 
example of this phenomenon. H. and Y. Lowenfeld say that 
the observable "change in society's attitude towards sex 
has made the conspicuous symptoms disappear ... and replaced 
by a multitude of character neurosis and psychosomatic 
manifestations. 11 46 This change in society's attitude has 
bent itself towards permissiveness assuming that the 
liberation of instincts is equivalent to freedom. This 
permissiveness neglects the proper maintenance of harmony 
among the different agents of the human personality, and, 
consequently, the individual loses his or her equilibrium 
and also loses a realistic contact with the external world. 
Another example of how society neglects the 
psychological states of the individual is the concentration 
on materialism which eventually leads to material wealth. 
Freud warns us that the survival of a society does not 
depend on the accumulation of wealth. He says, 
It has become clear that civilization cannot 
consist principally ... in wealth itself and the 
46. H. & Y. Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and the 
Superego: Some Current Thoughts about Freud's Cultural 
Concepts," from The Psychology of Adolescence, p. 496. 
69 
means of acquiring .•. for these things are 
threatened by the rebelliousness and destructive 
mania of the participants in civilization.47 
Freud implicitly means what Aristotle calls "greed." So, 
the liberation of instincts as well as the emphasis on 
materialism reflects the idea on how a permissive society 
gives an ultimate authority to one and only one factor as 
the sole reason for directing the individual's life. That 
said, we assume that such kinds of attitudes are the result 
of overlooking two important factors: Firstly, the harmony 
and the unity of the person, and, secondly, the moderation 
which is a crucial aspect of building up the character of 
the person. Consequently, the "pleasure principle" 
dominates one's life and the "feeble" but "persistent" ego 
is unable to process the introjection and the repression 
mechanisms through which the ego takes them upon itself to 
"erect" them again as an "obstacle within itself." The 
introjection and the repression mechanisms are weakened and 
the "reality principle" is given up to the "pleasure 
principle." This kind of character is called by Aristotle 
a "self-indulgent" character. 
Moreover, in such kinds of society the role of the 
father is reduced and the process of identification and 
internalization is reduced, too. The lasting effects of 
the first identification with the parents which takes place 
47. s. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 10. 
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"earlier than any object cathexis" is blocked and the 
result is a great disappointment. This is due to the 
discrepancy between the infantile and the later image of 
the father. H. and Y. Lowenfeld maintain, 
The contemporary father acts much more like a 
weak older brother. We have always seen that the 
milder father does not lead to a milder 
superego .•. but rather to an increase of fantasies 
and projections. For the development of the 
superego the projections are decisive; power and 
cruelty of the parents are magnified by the 
fantasies. 11 48 
Eventually, the ego fails to do the work of reality 
testing. This disappointment with the later image of the 
father is replaced by a disappointment in society, 
traditions, and history. The cultural ideal which, 
according to Freud, provides the individual with a 
"narcissistic" attitude is replaced by distrust and self-
centeredness. Aristotle calls this kind of character the 
"hoarding" character. In this context, the word 
"narcissism" used by Freud implies a moderate narcissism of 
similar meaning to pride; e.g., the teacher says to his or 
her student "I am proud of you." It is a "mean" between 
infantile narcissism and pathological narcissism. 
48. H. & Y. Lowenfeld, "Our Permissive Society and the 
Superego: Some Current Thoughts About Freud's Cultural 
Concepts." From The Psychology of Adolescence, p. 500. 
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Narcissism in this sense is related to the ego-ideal. 
aaving an ego-ideal or a model helps the individual to 
accept something "unpleasant" for the sake of an ideal. It 
also helps in the suppression of the instinctual drives. 
Freud explains this as follows: 
The satisfaction which the ideal offers to the 
participants in the culture is thus of a 
narcissistic nature; it rests on their pride in 
what has already been successfully achieved .... 
The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the 
cultural ideal is also among the forces which are 
successful in combating the hostility to culture 
within cultural unit. This satisfaction can be 
shared in not only by the favored classes .•• but 
also by the suppressed ones, since the right to 
despise the people outside it compensates them 
for the wrongs they suffer within their own 
unit.49 
From the above discussion we come to know that self-
indulgence is the result of the freedom given to the 
"sexual" instincts. This leads to the weakening of the ego 
control and the ego adaptive alliances with the two other 
agents. As a result, the ego-ideal exemplified by the 
father is weakened and given up to an aggressive and 
distrustful fantasies, but one might argue that, at least, 
49. S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 13. 
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the sexual urges are satisfied. Clinical psychoanalytic 
research has shown contrary result. Freud explains this. 
ge says, 
If sexual freedom is unrestricted from the outset 
the result is not better. It can easily be shown 
that the psychical value of erotic needs is 
reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes 
easy. An obstacle is required in order to 
heighten the libido.n50 
The notion of obstacle, in this sense, is very important. 
It is the function of the ego which allows a well timed, 
necessary alliance with one of the other agents of the 
psyche; it is an alliance in order to exercise self 
control. The self-controlled man as appears in Aristotle's 
ethics is a virtuous man. 
What else results from the reduction of the 
"obstacle?" The reduction in the power of the "obstacle" 
over the aggressive drives creates in the individual a 
sense of self-absorption in his or her own desires and 
needs. This results in the loss of interest in 
relationships, and contributes to the projection of 
fantasies on the external reality. Consequently, reality 
testing is impaired. It also adds an " ... amazing lack of 
fear," i.e., a "foolhardy" character. This leads to two 
important features: "aggression" and the desire for an 
50. S. Freud, Standard Edition, v. II, p. 187. 
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11easY life." This means that the individual possesses the 
vices of laziness, lack of self-control and foolhardiness. 
In addition to the weakening of the ego by the 
tyrannous onslaughts of the id and superego, the ego has 
its excessive functioning. In our everyday language we 
describe a person by saying that he has a "big ego" or he 
is going on an "ego trip" Using these description we imply 
that this person is arrogant, stubborn, etc. These 
qualifications attributed to a person whether in the 
religious traditions or the Aristotelean traditions are 
called vices. In Freud's words this ego loses having 
"flexibility" and "craft." Edith Jacobson in her article 
"Denial and Repression" presents us with a case of a man 
who, repressing and denying his childhood traumatic 
experiences with his mother, reached a point of denying the 
existence of both the _id and the superego. This is to say 
that this man's ego wards off the existence of what is 
external to itself and becomes like a king without 
subjects.51 
Typology 
In the course of this chapter we have seen that both 
Freud and Aristotle show interest in character, character 
which distinguishes in thought and action one person from 
another. The difference between Freud and Aristotle is 
51. Edith Jacobson, "Denial and Repression," Journal of 
American Psychoanalytic Association, October, 1957, 
Vol. 5, pp. 64-69. 
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that Aristotle qualified the person's character between 
virtuous and vicious. Freud was satisfied in describing 
the psychodynamic of the human psyche. But, as Freud 
always said that morality is self-evident; and since, as H. 
Hartmann says that Freud never meant to break off from the 
principles of the Greco-Roman nor from the principles of 
the Judeo-Christian traditions, then, we can take Freud up 
on his position that some human characters are vicious. 
Let us start with his typology and try to see how close he 
is to Aristotle. Since our concern is vice, we are going 
to concentrate on the "vicious" character and overlook the 
virtuous ones. 
I) The Oral Personality. A person who fixates on the 
oral stage tends to be, to a large extent, passive and 
receptive, subservient, a follower, trusting, optimistic, 
and accepting. He or she also tends to be a heavy eater 
and enjoys activities related to the mouth. But, since, as 
discussed before, opposite characters do coexist in the 
same person, as they stem from the same "sexual instinct," 
an oral character might be hostile. In book 4, Chapter 5 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle equates hostility with 
"excessive anger," a quality of character which includes 
these characteristics: 
1. Those who get angry at the wrong people, at the 
"wrong time." 
2. Those who get angry quickly -- irascible people. 
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3. Those who are "quick tempered to extreme." 
4. Those who are hard to reconcile -- bitter people. 
5. Those who are irritable by "the wrong things." 
II) Anal Personality. The anal character exposes the 
following characteristics: Orderly, hoarding, and 
obstinate. Character traits such as hoarding, miserly or 
obstinate originated in an early conflict with parents over 
when to "go potty. 11 52 It also stems from lack of parental 
appreciation to "fecal matter" which is "the first gift 
that the child has for the parent. 11 53 As a result, the 
child likes to keep it for himself, and consequently, the 
child develops the tendency to be a taker than a giver. 
In Aristotle's ethics, hoarding is the vice of 
"deficient giving." He calls it ungenerosity. 
It comes more naturally to human beings than 
wastefulness; for the many are money-lovers 
rather than givers ... For it consists in two 
conditions, deficiency in giving and excess in 
taking. 54 
III) Urethral Personality. This character trait is 
the result of humiliation of enuresis. The child develops 
a "burning ambition to succeed in life. 11 55 He or she aims 
52. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. IX, p. 169. 
53. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 81. 
54. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 4, 1, 112lb. 
55. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. IX, p. 175. 
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onlY for his or her success and develops an inhibited 
"envious" attitude. Considering humiliation as its root, 
competitiveness hides a sense of inferiority which acts as 
a catalyst for wishing an easy success. Disappointed by 
the difficult struggle, this person tends to be easily 
bored and consequently ends up being unsuccessful. Being 
ambitious, yet, unsuccessful, he or she tends to be 
selfish, crude and exploitative. His or her sexuality is 
energized by competing to obtain other wives or husbands in 
particular in fantasie~. 
Let us take what Aristotle says about envy in his 
Rhetoric. 
Those who in any respect are ambitious of glory 
are given to envy in that respect ..•. (Envy is] 
a sort of pain at apparent good fortune .... Men 
also envy those with whom they are at rivalry •••. 
And as men are affected by ambition in regard to 
rivals, and competitors, and all •.. who are eager 
after the same objects, it must follow that they 
envy these in a special manner .... And those who 
either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed 
at all, envy those who succeed quickly.n56 
In other words, an envious person is selfish. 
IV) The Phallic Personality. This type of 
56. Aristotle, Treatise on Rhetoric, trans. Theodore 
Buckley (London: George Bell and Sons., 1903), bk 2, 
10, (3-4)' pp. 145-146. 
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personality trait shows a "sexualized pattern." It results 
from an unsatisfactory resolution of the Oedipal stage. 
The person shows the following inclinations: 1) Self-
centered, 2) egotistical, 3) lustful with a vengeance 
attitude, 4) revolutionary "[males] not accepting the 
paternal superego. 11 57 5) "Masculinity complex1158 among 
females. 
From this description of the phallic personality we 
are able to observe that the person lacks "temperance" and 
possesses "self-indulgence," i.e., an intemperate person. 
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle maintains that 
temperance " ..• is a mean concerned with pleasures ... for it 
is concerned less, and in a different way, with pains. 
Intemperance appears in this same area too •... 59 To enjoy 
these things, [body pleasures] and to like them most of all 
is bestial •... The touching that is proper to the 
intemperate person concerns only some parts of the body, 
not all of it. 11 60 
V) The Genital Personality. The genital person, 
according to Freud, is the healthiest among all the other 
types. Yet, we need to caution ourselves that Freud 
clearly states that the line of demarcation between health 
57. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, pp. 91-92. 
58. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXII, pp. 129-130. 
59. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, 10, 1117b. 
60. Ibid., 1118b. 
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and sickness is ambiguous. This is to say that the 
boundaries oscillate and overlap. If the genital. person is 
the healthiest, then, let us consider this personality 
~ 
trait as an "idee-limite." We need to ask why it is the 
healthiest. The answer is simple. At the age of six the 
child has already formed a "person prototype," i.e., the 
parents as an "image" to identify with. J. Rychlak 
explains this phrase as follows: 
Since the personality structure is finalized by 
the onset of latency .•• Freud had no need to 
frame a latency or adolescent personality 
type •••• All this means •.. is that the person is 
finally capable of reproduction and presumably 
can find in sexual relations the satisfactions 
that he or she had obtained earlier from the 
pregenital erogenous zones. 11 61 
But how many pass the pregenital erogenous zones without 
any neurotic drawbacks is debatable in Freud's thought. 
More precisely, the genital personality traits overlap with 
other traits resulted from an early fixation during the 
child's development. 
In this regard, considering Aristotle's approach to 
the human character, we notice, as discussed before, that 
negative and positive qualities do coexist. This is to 
61. Joseph F. Rychlack, Introduction to Personality and 
Psychotherapy, p. 80. 
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say, that one or more characteristics dominate the others 
without eliminating their existence. And if we assume that 
the genital person is the "generous" man in Aristotle then 
the "generous man" is not without certain dissatisfactions. 
I 
Therefore, the genital personality is an "idee-limite." 
As-A-Matter-of-Language 
Considering what Paul Ricoeur says that psychoanalysis 
is a new language at our disposal, one might raise the 
following question: How do we know that Freud means by the 
excess or the deficiency of the activities of the three 
agents of the psyche what Aristotle means? The answer lies 
in the implicit side of Freud's writings. L. Wittgenstein 
in his book, Philosophical Grammar, says that a basic idea 
is a rule which determines meaning within the language.62 
In this regard, we can say that Aristotle demands one 
language with one set of rules and Freud uses another 
language. But the key is the use of terms in each 
language, i.e., the use of "vice" in Aristotle and the use 
of "neurotic" or "psychotic" ego in Freud. If so, then, 
they have the same meaning in different languages. Let us 
give a simple everyday life example. In the film, Fiddler 
on the Roof, Teviah asks his wife Golda, "Do you love me?" 
Golda's only answer was that she always washed his clothes, 
cooked his dinners, and took care of their children. Her 
62. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans 
Antony Kerny (London: William Clowes & Sons Ltd., 
1974), p. 32. 
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answer means the same as the answer his daughter gave to 
her Christian lover: "Yes, I love you." 
In our readings of Freud, nothing is detected which 
shows Freud ever compared his thought with Aristotle's. 
sut, undoubtedly, as mentioned before, Freud never detached 
himself from the Western Greco-Roman traditions. In this 
regard, let us see how Freud relates the language of the 
Middle Ages to his psychoanalytic language. In describing 
the notion of the "return of the repressed," he says, 
[the repressed feelings] are stored up and enjoy 
an unsuspected existence in a sort of shadow 
kingdom, till they emerge like bad spirits and 
take control of the body, which, as a rule under 
the orders of the predominant ego-
consciousness. 63 
Freud uses the words "bad spirits" in reference to the 
"mass hysteria" which used to occur among clergy and nuns 
during the middle ages. In other words, the return of the 
repressed means what used to be called "possessions by the 
devil." So, in this respect, different words refer to the 
same "basic idea," or, different words refer to the same 
meaning, or the practice or the activity the words refer 
to. 
Having this in mind, the practice and the activity of 
a person dominated by the "desiring id" is nothing but 
63. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol I. p. 127. 
81 
nself indulgence," "rash" and "reckless" in the 
Aristotelian sense; and, the practice and the activity of a 
person dominated by the codes of the superego refers in 
Aristotelian sense to a "deficient pleasure''; and, finally, 
the activity and practice associated with an excess of 
"ego" is what is called arrogance, boastfulness and vanity 
in the Aristotelian sense. From this we conclude that the 
implicit meaning underlying the excess and deficient 
activity of any of the three personality agents is "vice." 
These practices and activities contribute to the "ruin" of 
the person's ethical conduct in relation to himself or 
herself as well as to his or her relation to society. 
Extreme Denial as Vice Par Excellence 
In the first chapter we discussed the state of 
schizophrenia. The link in the state of schizophrenia 
between the "word presentation" (the conscious) and the 
"thing presentation" (the unconscious) is cut off to an 
extreme degree. Also, we discussed that, according to 
Freud, denial is a primitive mechanism which wards off the 
external reality. But due to the notion of "leakage" the 
mechanism of denial is never complete and an absolute 
I 
schizophrenia is an "idee-limite. 11 And since denial of the 
external world is never complete, we come to know that 
there is a minimum acknowledgment of what is denied. The 
question we would like to address is: Why the person is not 
able to continue encountering what is acknowledged in the 
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external world? In our opinion, the answer could be simply 
stated, i.e., the lack of virtues, such as "the virtue of 
compromise" and "the virtue of prudence" which the 
psychoanalyst tries to reenact in the client. Implied in 
this comment is the lack of courage to face reality, the 
lack of prudence to discern what to do at the right time 
and in the right place, and the lack of temperance to 
exercise self-control. The person falls into a vicious 
state of mind. 
In this second chapter we have concerned ourselves 
with the common places between Freud and Aristotle; common 
places which show the crucial activities by which the 
person assumes his or her "being in the world." Also, we 
alluded to what is vice according to Aristotle and how the 
psychoanalytic language of Freud refers to the same "basic 
idea." As vice is implicit in Freud, so is denial implicit 
in Aristotle. This means that if the social external world 
is denied, the person cannot fulfill his or her humanity, 
i.e., the person is to a large extent unable to reason, 
interact, incorporate values and live in participation with 
his or her fellow humans. 
Moreover, the external world which is responsible for 
the differentiation of the ego and the superego, and which 
tries to tame the aggressive sexual instincts of the 
individual is to a large degree disavowed. In relation to 
the individual's self-fulfillment, the world in which this 
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individual tries to regain unity with the "lost object," 
i.e., the mother, is also lost and denied. Instead of 
indulging oneself in this necessary, unavoidable "tragic" 
battle, the individual reverses this necessity into a world 
of hallucination and regresses to the "auto-erotic" stage 
which is the prerequisite to the emergence of the social 
life. 
Comparing this detrimental denial to other vices, such 
as vanity, stinginess, rash, arrogance, foolhardy, envy, 
lust, cowardice, etc., we notice that such vices although 
they show an overriding tendencies over some virtues 
possessed by the same person, yet, the person remains a 
social being capable of participating, capable of 
committing some virtuous acts. Considering this, the 
notion of as-a-matter-of-degree reemerges again; for if we 
consider the above mentioned vices as vices which "ruin," 
it follows that an extreme denial is an extreme repression 
or inhibition of what is called the "impulse of life." 
Therefore, it is vice par excellence. No wonder that 
Goethe refers to denial as a satanic act.64 
64. Goethe, Faust, Trans Philip Wayne (New York: Penguine 
Books Ltd., 1985), Part I, Sc. II. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Introduction 
Our concern in this chapter is to answer the following 
question: How do we encounter denial? In order to answer 
this question three important symptomatic notions will be 
discussed: anxiety, separateness, and perception. 
In discussing these three important notions we promise 
no absolute clarity. The limitations imposed on us are 
inherent in the ambiguity of some fundamental principles. 
Ambiguity may be "humiliating" in any philosophical or 
psychological discussions, but it is also a fact of our 
everyday life in which we inevitably learn how to feel at 
home. Freud writes, 
We can console ourselves with the: thought that we 
have been obliged to build our way out into the 
dark. If we are not wholly in error, other lines 
of approach are bound to lead us into much the 
same region and the time may then come when we 
shall find ourselves more at home in it.1 
How does Freud help us by maintaining this position? 
Without denying the importance of deep speculative 
1. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. J. 
Strachey (New York: Avon Books, The Hogarth Press, 
ltd., 1964), p. 588. 
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theoretical issues, he simply wants us to make use of .what 
is helpful for practical reaso~s. According to Freud, 
since it is, for example, difficult to determine whether 
darkness is the least light or light is the least darkness, 
we just accept the most recurrent practical fact that light 
is in the day time and darkness is at night. We come to 
affirm our position that in this discussion we are not 
going to speculate whether the known or the denied reality 
is completely presented to us with utmost clarity. Our 
concern is how persons reject and disavow what is painful 
and intolerable. In this connection, we will notice that 
what is ambiguous in a certain expression or another 
assumes a kind of meaning in form of symptoms. Merleau-
Ponty interprets this notion in Freud's literature as 
follows: 
Ambiguity is of the essence of human existence, 
and everything we live or think has always 
several meanings .... Existence is indeterminate 
in itself by reason of its fundamental structure, 
and in so far as it is the very process whereby 
the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning ... 
chance is transformed into reason in so far as it 
is the act of taking up a de facto situation.2 
2. M. Merleau-Ponti, Phenomenoloy of Perception, 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York: The Humanities 
Press, 1974), p. 169. 
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.Having this in mind, an attempt at flight is a symptom of 
denial which we encounter in different settings. So let us 
start with anxiety. 
Anxiety 
* * * 
In sooth, I know not why I am so sad: 
It wearies me; you say it wearies you; 
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, 
What stuff 'tis made of, wherefore it is born, 
I am to learn; 
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me, 
that I have much ado to know myself 
(Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice 
Act I, Sc I) 
In the first chapter we mentioned that the realization 
of the external world comes into being when the breast of 
the mother has to be separated from the infant. With such 
a separation the infant starts to realize that the breast 
is something over there, i.e., an object to be denied in 
order to satisfy certain internal needs. In other words, 
desiring and attaining this object means minimizing the 
excess of stimulation, i.e., achieving a certain 
satisfactory degree of the "pleasure principle." Also, 
being over there the breast of the mother is a something 
which is lost. This is to say, something which is absent. 
Having this in mind, the emergence of the external world 
starts to have an impact on the infant. This is known as 
the end of the auto-erotic stage. But how does Freud go 
about explaining this development? By answering this 
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question we will come to have a grip on the notion of 
anxiety. 
Not only did Freud struggle in expla~ning the enigma 
of the unconscious, but he also underwent great 
intellectual pains in how to explain the realization of the 
external world. In his two papers, "Negation" and 
"Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety", Freud comes up with 
his explanation. In "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" he 
explains the notion of anxiety. It is worth mentioning 
that in neither paper does Freud tackle the notion of 
denial. But in these theoretically important papers, Freud 
lays down the context by which we come to understand why 
and how one can do away with the external world. In this 
regard, the notion of danger is very important, and it will 
be discussed in due course. 
Both papers have one common similarity; the notion of 
the loss of object. In other words, having an object which 
is lost means the experience of something out there, and 
this leads the infant to reality testing, i.e., a reality 
out there external to oneself. So, the contribution of 
"Negation" and "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" to the 
notion of denial is that in a psychotic state it 
is the reaction to a loss which reality affirms, 
but which the ego has to disavow, since it finds 
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it insupportable. Thereupon the ego breaks off 
its relation to reality •... 3 
In "Negation" Freud says, "But it is evident that a 
precondition for the setting-up of reality testing is that 
objects should have been lost ••.. 11 4 In the "Inhibitions, 
symptoms and Anxiety" he gives us his conclusion, 
The conclusion we have reached is that anxiety 
comes to be a reaction to the danger of a loss of 
an object •.. the first determinant of anxiety, 
which the ego itself introduces, is loss of 
perception of the object.5 
How does he come to this conclusion? 
It is not rare in Freud's literature to note that the 
first five years of the life of the human being are the 
most important as they contribute to later development. 
Accordingly, in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" Freud 
starts his discussion of anxiety by mentioning that birth 
is the "prototype" of anxiety. Being the "prototype" of 
anxiety, we need to ask this question: What is the nature 
of this birth anxiety? Or, is it biological or 
psychological? Freud's answer is that the separation from 
3. Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. strachey, 
(London, from 1953-), Vol. XIV, p. 233. 
4. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, p. 238. 
5. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, pp. 169-170; 
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the mother is understood biologically.6 In this regard, 
anxiety is "an affective symbol which biological necessity 
demands that a situation of danger should have. 117 In this 
sense, birth anxiety has a "prototype" relation to danger. 
Although it is biological, yet, ambiguously speaking, it is 
a sort of anxiety whose nature Freud does not explicate. 
aut, he tells us that it happens without explaining why or 
how. In other words, for Freud as for Nietzsche8 things 
happen simply because t:.hey happen; "What happens is that 
the child's biological situation as a foetus is replaced ... 
by a psychical object-relation to its mother. 119 So, 
understanding it as prototypic of the danger situation, 
i.e., the loss of object, i.e., the mother, is 
"generalized" so that in the live of the person it refers 
to the anxiety involved in any later "object losses." This 
is to say, anxiety acts upon the individual whenever the 
threat of danger arises. So, what the infant encounters is 
two kinds of anxieties: 1) biologica110 (birth) and 2) 
psychological (loss of object). 
6. Ibid, p. 151. 
7. Ibid, p. 134. 
8. In his Birth of Tragedy, F. Nietzsche criticizes 
Euripedes for giving reasons to causes. Things happen 
because they happen as Sophocles shows in Oedipus Rex. 
9. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, p. 138. 
10. Freud does not give a name to this biological anxiety. 
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Speaking of a sort of anxiety (biological), we need to 
ask this question: does Freud mean that this kind of 
anxiety is an interruption of a prenatal Nirvana? If yes, 
Freud does not explain what constitutes this interruption 
and he does not explain why it happens. But as he teaches 
us "if we cannot see things clearly we will at least see 
clearly what the obscurities are.nll This prompts us to 
pose two other questions: why are they obscure and 
ambiguous? Is ambiguity a reality? Although it is worth 
answering these questions, yet, they are not what really 
concern us in this chapter. 
Now, what does Freud mean by danger? Or, what does he 
refer to? In the body of "Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety" he maintains, 
The situation ... which [the infant] regards as a 
danger and against which it wants to be 
safeguarded is that of non-satisfaction, of a 
growing tension due to need, against which it is 
helpless .... The situation of non-satisfaction 
in which the amounts of stimulation rise to an 
unpleasurable height without its being possible 
for them to be mastered psychically or discharged 
must for the inf ant be analogous to the 
experience of being born ... must be a repetition 
of the situation of danger. What both situations 
11. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XX, p. 124. 
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have in common is the economic disturbance caused 
by an accumulation of amounts of stimulation 
which requires to be disposed of. It is this 
factor, then, which is the real essence of the 
danger.12 
In this sense the notion of danger is associated with what 
heightens the unpleasurable excitations. Due to the 
infant's helplessness, mastering the situation whether on 
the biological or the psychological level is an 
impossibility. So, to restore a constant level of 
excitation there must be an object, someone out-there to 
change this non-satisfaction to satisfaction. By 
experience the infant comes to realize the presence of 
another who is able to end this non-satisfaction. The 
inner disturbances are the means by which the mother is 
called in order to satisfy this emerging need. So it is 
the absence of the mother which is experienced as danger; 
and the infant's kicking and screaming are signs of danger 
as well as means of self preservation. 
When the inf ant finds out by experience that an 
external, perceptible object can put an end to 
the dangerous situation which is reminiscent of 
birth, the content of the danger it fears is 
displaced from the economic situation on to the 
condition which determined that situation, viz., 
12. Ibid, p. 137. 
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the loss of object. It is the absence of the 
mother that is now the danger; and as soon as 
that danger arises the infant gives the signal of 
anxiety •... This change constitutes the first 
great step forward in the provision made by the 
infant for its self-preservation.13 
Having this in mind, loss of object absence of the 
mother -- is what determines the experience of an 
"external, perceptible object." This means that it is 
through the absence of the mother that her presence is 
recognized. Moreover, giving the signal for help, the 
infant not only maintain self-preservation, but also learns 
how to master this unpleasurable situation. 
In this context, we come to know how Freud brings "the 
significance of the real external world" to his theory. 
That said, another crucial issue should be considered. It 
is the realization of an external reality which brings the 
infant into the state of being in the world. Without this 
process, the infant would have stayed in the "Nirvana," 
i.e., "I am all and the all is me." In this regard, we 
come to an equation that an extreme denial is not being in 
the world, i.e., a regression to the auto-erotic stage 
rather than a "progressive" movement into the world, i.e., 
subject/object relation by which the reality testing is 
accomplished. 
13. Ibid. p. 138. 
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Maintaining this position, we understand that maternal 
care is not only the agent of satisfaction, but it is that 
bY which the infant experiences security. Parental care 
does not allow an extreme catastrophic situation to take 
place. We also learn that the physiological satisfaction 
is "transposed" to a psychological presence, i.e. the 
presence of the mother -- a "psychical object relation." 
so, prior to the absence of the mother, the infant does not 
experience its ego, nor does he experience a "meaningful 
perception." Loss of object is the prime determiner of 
anxiety. By going through this anxiety the infant comes in 
touch with the external world for self-preservation. 
Anxiety, absence, presence, reality testing are 
inevitable conditions in the progressive development of the 
infant. The question we would like to pose is: how does 
the child learn to live his paradox? In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud introduces us to the game which 
he considers a "great cultural achievement." It is the 
effective entry of the child into a world of 
absence/presence. In other words, the child learns the 
acceptance of the "loss which reality affirms." 
Visiting his sister Sophie, Freud had the opportunity 
to observe his nephew playing a game invented by himself. 
The little "good boy" takes any small object and throws it 
away. Doing so, he utters the expression 0-0-0-0- which 
means, according to his mother, "Fort," i.e., "gone." Then 
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searching for his lost object, and, upon finding it the 
child joyfully expresses himself by saying "da" which means 
"there." Freud maintains that through this game the child 
comes to master the painful reality of the loss of object; 
a painful reality followed by the reappearance of the 
object. "Fort-da was related to the child's great cultural 
achievement •.•• The instinctual renunciation which he had 
in allowing his mother to go away without protesting.n14 
In this sense the child reconciles with reality by 
experiencing that absence is a livable reality. What makes 
it promising is the disappearance of the mother which is 
followed by ·her appearance. In this connection, the child 
develops a 'link' between what is present and what is 
absent. This is the end of the auto-erotic stage. 
Following Freud's train of thought, we notice that the 
end of the erotic stage is itself something that is lost. 
The ego develops its relation with the external as well as 
with the internal world. These two worlds exist to the ego 
as that which "appear" and "disappear". The ego is in the 
world. Being in the world it develops the readiness for 
accepting the dialectic of presence/absence as a reality. 
This game is the art of making what is tragic as a 
promising livable entity. 
The game "Fort-Da" contributes to another order in the 
life of the child. It is the order of language. "Fort" 
14. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 15. 
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and "Da" are two expression of double meaning. This is to 
say, they are equivocal. Paul Ricoeur explains this, 
By the same token language itself is from the 
outset and for the most part distorted: it means 
something other than what it says, it has a 
double meaning. It is equivoca1.15 
In this vein, "Fort-Da" means something other than "there" 
and "gone." The expression refers to absence/presence. 
More deeply, it refers to what this absence/presence refers 
to. It is the mastery of being in the world. 
After this brief discussion of the notion of anxiety, 
we come to understand that the drama of life as described 
by Freud is a paradoxical one. It is from the pain of 
separation that an infant moves towards the pleasure of 
mastery: and from this pleasure of mastery it becomes a 
being in the world who progressively moves towards death. 
Why are we thrown into this world? To this question, Freud 
does not give us any answer.16 
Since we are destined to being in the world, denial in 
its extreme sense is contrary to the progressive movements 
of the infant's life. It is facilitated by two major 
15. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 7. 
16. We refer the reader to David Bakan's, Sigmund Freud 
and the Jewish Mystical Traditions (London: o. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958). Bakan argues that 
Freud's psychoanalysis is deeply rooted in the Jewish 
mystical tradition. From Bakan's perspective on could 
find an answer to this question, i.e., a theological 
interpretation of Freud's psychoanalysis. 
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factors: the mechanism of regression and the absence of 
parental care. Absence of parental care has the following 
effects: a) Blocks a healthy discovery of object 
relationship; b) Incapacitates the person to deal with the 
demands impinging from the external world; c) Gives way to 
the immediate gratification of the blind forces of the id; 
d) Prohibits the playfulness which leads to a healthy 
mastery of the surrounding world; e) Disrupts the use of 
consistent language; and f) Disturbs what is rational or 
articulate. Having this in mind, we can assume the 
position that denial is set into motion as a result of a 
certain high degree of anxiety. This anxiety is developed 
as a reaction to what is perceived by the agent as an 
intolerable danger. We also come to realize that "loss of 
object" is the prime determinant of anxiety. So, what 
becomes the real issue in this context is the notion of 
separateness. This is the point to be discussed in the 
next section. 
* * * 
Good night, good night! Parting is such sweet 
sorrow. 
That I shall say good night till it be morrow. 
Shakespeare 
Romeo and Juliet 
Act II, Sc. II 
Separateness 
Before we start, an important point should be 
mentioned. It has become very clear that in Freud's 
thought isolating one notion from another is in a practical 
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sense extremely difficult due to the inter-relatedness and 
the interdependence of all psychic phenomena. This implies 
that we can distinguish them in their unity which underlies 
what is distinct in them. Metaphorically speaking, it is 
like a theme in a symphony put in different settings with 
different variations. 
The mastery by the child of the dialectic absence/ 
presence can be rephrased into a mastery of "separation" 
from the mother. This is to say, the "loss which reality 
affirms" assures the infant's mode of being in the world. 
In other words, the physical and the psychological distance 
assumed by the separation process is also understood as a 
mode of relating to another. So, relationships imply 
separation. E. ortigues says that the separation between 
the infant and the mother is that which gives their 
relation its significance.17 That said, we can adopt the 
assumption that denial of separateness is denial of 
relationships. 
In the first chapter we discussed three notions of 
denial, namely, 
1) Denial A (Schizophrenia) 
2) Denial B (Neurosis as came to be realized in 
Freud's study of Fetishism.) 
17. E. & M.C. Ortigues, Oedipe Africian, "n.p.", Paris, 
1966, p. 70. "Comme on voit, ce qui est "seperateur" 
entre la mere et l'enfant, c'est d'abord ce qui· 
signifie leur relation." 
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3) Denial c (The denial of the nonexistence of the 
penis in the female genitalia. It is an 
unavoidable happening in the normalcy of 
development in every child.) 
we also need to bear in mind that the boundaries between 
neurosis and psychosis oscillate and depend on the degree 
of regression, and, also, depend on the degree of readiness 
to deny in the individual. so, in discussing specifically 
the neurotic denial, it is not meant to refer only to 
fetishism. This is because underlying the notion of 
fetishism lies the denial of separation; taking into 
consideration that a person takes the fetish as a symbol of 
what was lost. In most general terms, Freud explains the 
person's generalized attitude as follows. He says, 
It has been quite correctly pointed out that a 
child gets the idea of a narcissistic injury 
through a bodily loss from the experience of 
losing his mother's breast after sucking, from 
the daily surrender of his faeces and, indeed, 
even from his separation from the womb at birth. 
Nevertheless, one ought not to speak of a 
castration complex until this idea of a loss has 
become connected with male genitals.18 
So we develop a generalized attitude -- symbolic mediation 
which qualifies the blurred line of demarcation between 
18. S. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XIX, p. 144. 
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neuroses and psychoses. In other words, in neuroses the 
ego loses to some extent its synthetic function. How? 
Freud gives us the answer in his paper "Splitting of 
the Ego in the Defensive Process" in which he emphasizes 
the fact that what is at issue is the ego's rejection of 
reality while it maintains some acceptance of its 
perception of another portion of reality. This partial 
rejection of reality shows a connection between denial, 
reality testing and separateness. Separateness is what is 
painful, i.e., what is denied. As a result of rejecting 
this painful experience the ego loses the distinction 
between the self and the world outside, or, the object 
relation. This is to say, a "fusion" between the self and 
the object. But, what makes this fusion possible? Freud's 
answer is the "wish." He defines it as 
A current of this kind in the [psychical] 
apparatus starting from unpleasure and aiming at 
pleasure, we have termed a 'wish'; and we have 
asserted that only a wish is able to set the 
apparatus in motion and that the course of 
excitation in it is automatically regulated by 
feelings of pleasure and unpleasure.19 
The motion in the context of denial of separateness is 
regressive. 
19. s. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 637. 
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Now, let us pose the case that may happen in many 
educational settings. Oftentimes, it is noticed that some 
students strive hard to be "A" students. Let us suppose 
that these students like to be considered as unique in 
their own right. A teacher may observe that some students 
feel threatened amidst such intense competitive atmosphere. 
As a reaction these students search for a haven and desire 
to replace this undesirable atmosphere by the safety of an 
unconditional submission to the teacher's will. In this 
case, they become like a fetish who replaces the loss which 
reality affirms by a thing such as a handkerchief. They 
start to idealize the teacher with the belief that this 
person has the ability to make this unbearable reality a 
soft one. 
So, considering this, their excellent achievements are 
not due to their tireless efforts, but their reliance on 
the teacher to act as their "ego-function." But let us 
assume that at a certain time this teacher resigns, gets 
transferred, or gets sick and can no longer be there. Or 
let us also assume that the teacher is one of those who 
respect individual differences and a reasonable 
independency. In this situation, it would be remarkably 
noticeable that these students get frustrated and start 
complaining about work, learning, and relationships. 
Actually, what is really the cause of frustration is not 
work, learning, or the low quality of these relationships, 
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but, firstly, the ego's immaturity in relation to its 
object, and, secondly, the withdrawal of the teacher who 
was adopted as a personal ego. These students are not able 
to handle the demands of reality; they become overwhelmed, 
helpless, and finally, expose either a partial or a massive 
denial of what is perceived as unpleasant. In her article 
"Denial and Repression," E. Jacobson refers to this "meek 
submission" as the "introjection" of another ego to 
oneself . 20 
Since at school we don't find extreme cases of 
schizophrenia (massive denial), we wish to restrict our 
discussion to partial denial. It is a partial alienation 
which "aims at denying the existence of the particular 
event that occasioned the outbreak of insanity. But 
actually every neurotic does the same with some fragment of 
reality.n21 How do we encounter this neurotic 
manifestation? In the case presented, it is expected that 
after the withdrawal of the teacher's support, one of the 
most recurrent symptoms of denial which is expected to 
appear is the wish to sleep, i.e., the regression to a 
dreamy state. It is a regression by which the subject 
undoes the pain of separateness by creating the illusion 
that the "object" cannot be "lost." 
20. Edith Jacobson, "Denial and Repression," Journal of 
American Psychoanalytic Association, October, 1957, 
No. 4, Vol. 5, p. 69. 
21. S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 13. 
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The wish to sleep, according to Freud, is "the factor 
of withdrawal from the external world [which makes) 
possible the regressive character of representation in 
dreams. 11 2 2 From this we can understand, as Freud implies, 
that the unconscious wish is also effective during daytime. 
It is like a magnet which attracts what is unpleasurable at 
the present to what is still infantile and pleasurable in 
the depth of the psyche. Freud maintains, "a wish which is 
represented in a dream must be an inf anti le one. 1123 
students in such a state of mind move along with this 
regression to a state where separateness is diminished; a 
state of "I-am-all" or the state of "the-world-is-me." 
This shows itself by observing their expected behavior. 
They 
1) absent themselves from classes with the excuse of 
being tired and need some sleep. 
2) use alcohols, drugs, etc ... , as a real instigator 
of a dreamy state. 
3) sit in class dozing off; pulled by two opposite 
poles: listening and not listening, seeing and 
not seeing. 
4) rebel against the teacher's class material and 
the school system because they see the school as 
a boring setting. 
22. s. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 629. 
23. Ibid, p. 592. 
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5) fantasize a more gratifying reality as a 
substitute for the painful existing one. 
6) lose the skill or art of living and tend to be 
idealistic in their inclinations, i.e., the world 
must be a loving one; a most beautiful Nirvana. 
considering these points, it is obvious how the pleasure 
principle takes hold of the student's judgement, attitude, 
and perception. What is considered as normal in dealing 
with their everyday life is "submitted to abnormal 
treatment 11 24 of the unconscious wish to regress to either 
the "auto-erotic" or to a "narcissistic" stage. In both 
stages there is immediate gratification, fusion of the 
subject/object relation, and a replacement of the painful 
external reality to an altered state of perception. 
To sum up, separation from the mother is the first 
determinant of anxiety. It is an anxiety caused by our 
experience of danger which is associated with the absence 
of the mother upon the emergence of inner needs. Growing 
from infancy to childhood, the child experiences learning 
of keeping up with the tragedy he was brought to. This is 
accomplished by parental care, and by games like "Fort-Da" 
by which the child makes out of this life a promising and a 
livable tragedy. 
But, in spite of this splendid conquest of the 
external reality, persons carry within themselves what is 
24. Ibid, p. 636. 
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inherent in the human psyche -- the dominance of the 
pleasure principle. Facing an intolerable danger, 
individuals regress to stages where they do away with what 
is painful. One of these anxiety provoking situations is 
the denial of separateness from the world. For these 
individuals "parting" becomes a sorrowful event but lacks 
the "sweet" mastery of absence/ presence. 
He thought he saw an Elephant 
That practiced on a fife: 
He looked again, and found it was 
A letter from his wife 
"At length I realize," he said 
"The bitterness of life!" 
Lewis Carroll 
The Gardener's song 
Perception 
Freud, a revolutionary of his time, gives a new 
formula of perception. In his outline of Psychoanalysis he 
says, 
The perceptual periphery of the cortex of the ego 
can be stimulated to a much greater extent from 
inside as well; internal events such as sequences 
of ideas and intellective processes can become 
conscious; and a special apparatus becomes 
necessary in order to distinguish between the two 
possibilities -- that is, what is known as 
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reality-testing. The equation "perception = 
reality (external world) no longer holds.25 
understanding the content of Freud's new formula one must 
ask the following question: what operation takes place in 
this "special apparatus?" The answer lies in the principle 
which regulates the process of mental functioning. Freud 
calls it the "pleasure principle" whose responsibility is 
to keep a constant quantity of excitation. This is in 
reaction to another principle which sets the mental 
apparatus in an opposite excitatory direction called the 
11 unpleasure principle" whose "final outcome coincides with 
lowering of that tension. 11 26 Underlying these two 
principles an inherent force is embedded in the psyche 
which gives both of these principles the power to activate 
themselves. Freud calls this force "compulsion to repeat." 
Considering this ambivalence in the nature of the 
psyche we also come to understand that the agents of the 
psyche are "semi-independent." Every activity has its 
counterpart within itself and outside itself. In his 
paper, "Formulation Regarding the Two Principles in Mental 
Functioning," Freud describes this as follows, "Just as the 
pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work towards gaining 
pleasure and avoiding 'pain,' so the reality-ego need do 
25. s. Freud, An outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. James 
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), p. 42. 
26. S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J. 
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1949), p. 1. 
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nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself 
against damage. 11 27 In other words, what is "useful" 
belongs to the domain of the "unpleasure principle" adopted 
by the reality-ego only as a step for future gratification, 
i.e., for the "pleasure principle." This may seem 
paradoxical; but it seems plausible considering the fact 
which Freud gives us in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: what 
is unpleasure for one system is pleasure for the other. 
Having briefly laid down the two principles which 
regulate the movement of the psychic apparatus, we would 
like to pose this question: what are the components of 
these two principles? The answer is the perceptions as 
they are preserved as "traces" in the unconscious and 
preconscious memory of the psyche, 
We possess a system [Perceptual-Conscious] Pept-
Cs, which receives perceptions but retains no 
permanent trace of them, so that it can react 
like a clean sheet to every new perception; while 
the permanent traces of the excitations which 
have been received are preserved in 'mnemic 
systems' lying behind the perceptual system.28 
But how do these perceptions act as a catalyst to the 
"wish" which, as discussed before, has the components of 
27. s. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 4, p. 18. 
28. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 176. 
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forwarding itself to satisfaction? Freud gives the answer 
in the Interpretation of Dreams. He says, 
An essential component of this experience of 
satisfaction is a particular perception •.. the 
mnemic image of which remains associated thence 
forward with the memory trace of the excitation 
produced by the need. As a result of the link 
that has thus been established, next time this 
need arises a psychical impulse will at once 
energy which will seek to recathect the mnemic 
image of the perception and to re-evoke the 
perception itself, that is to say, to re-
establish the situation of the original 
satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we 
call a wish.29 
There are three important points we gather from what is 
already mentioned: firstly, the external world is what 
makes human beings a "social animal." Secondly, although 
the unconscious traces are internal within the human 
psyche, their origin is based on the conscious or 
unconscious interaction with the objective world. This is 
to say, the experience of the objective world is 
"internalized" though impressions and perceptions, i.e., 
stored as memories. This leaves us with the notion that as 
human beings we are memory people. Thirdly, the 
29. s. Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 604-605. 
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dialectical tension that the psyche undergoes creates a 
state of paradoxes eased by the interference of primarily 
the "reality-testing ego" which keeps a harmonious 
relationships with the external world. How? By diplomacy, 
or, the "art" of survival as discussed in the second 
chapter. 
But before getting into how we encounter denial in 
perception, we must glance at how our perceptions normally 
act upon the world. In other words, knowing what is 
normally processed, we come to understand more clearly the 
pathological process. 
In this connection, we need to refer to the notion of 
absent/present as shown earlier. To recapitulate, it is 
worth mentioning that the "Fort-Da" game is what 
facilitates the perception of what is present. More 
clearly, there is a "link" with what is absent or lost 
which makes it present; present somewhere. Whether we can 
say that this "link" is what causes "imagination" is not to 
be considered in this discussion. But to be faithful to 
the line of this discussion, suffice to say that the "link" 
implies "relationship," i.e., "separation." Also, we come 
to understand that due to the disruptive powers within the 
psyche, perception, in this sense, is dependent on 
different factors. G.B. Levitas, an authority in 
psychoanalysis, maintains, 
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The human being's reaction to the world about him 
is at first very simple. As he matures, however, 
his perception comes to be dependent on many 
factors: his background and language, temperament 
and role, physical and emotional conditions. The 
reality of what he sees depends upon the way in 
which he interprets phenomena.30 
Freud is Kantian in this regard. This means that the 
"intention" behind the perception of the thing is what 
determines its interpretation. Furthermore, the "Fort-Da" 
game shows us that what is perceived by the child is not 
only what is present, but an absence "signified" by 
presence. Separation, therefore, is perceived as an 
occurrence of a presence which is absent. For the child 
what is absent is a prospective presence; it is a presence 
in "intention." Having this in mind, we can assume the 
position that for Freud the person's relation to the 
external reality as something separate is perceived in a 
symbolic way. No wonder that psychoanalysis is a tool by 
which "reduction of illusion" is achieved. 
From this discussion, what can we come up with about 
perception in respect to denial? With the development of 
the reality-testing ego, perception of the external world 
becomes a tool of relationships. But, with the weakening 
30. G.B. Levitas, The World of Psychology (New York: 
Georges Brazillen, 1963), Vol. I, p. 160. 
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of the reality-testing ego the perception of the outer 
world is blurred, and the chances for the mechanism of 
denial is strengthened. Why? The ego withdraws itself and 
becomes "insensitive" to the stimulations impinging from 
the external world and thereby lowering the level of 
consciousness. Consequently, in an extreme case, the ego 
reconstructs a perceptual reality of its own, and its 
orientation to the outer world is minimized. In the case 
of a neurotic denial, part of the external reality is 
replaced by a perception of another. 
In order to give an example of neurotic denial, let us 
concern ourselves with the notion of humor. In his paper 
"Humor," Freud considers humor as the "triumph of 
narcissism" and also of the "pleasure principle." It is an 
assertion of the ego in the face of a painful situation. 
Freud says, 
These last two characteristics, the denial of the 
claim of reality and the triumph of the pleasure 
principle, cause humor to approximate to the 
regressive or reactionary processes .... By its 
repudiation of the possibility of suffering, it 
takes its place in the great series of methods 
devised by the mind of man for evading the 
compulsion to suffer a series which begins with 
neurosis and culminates in delusions, and 
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includes intoxication, self-induced states of 
abstraction and ecstasy.31 
Accordingly, humor is that by which a person wards off an 
impending suffering by "repudiating" it. It means: "Look 
here! This is all that this seemingly dangerous world 
amounts to. 113 2 In an educational setting, it is often 
noticed that some students under the pressure of the final 
exams or any distressing classroom situation burst out into 
a fit of laughter for no reasons known to them. 
Sometimes, warding off a fragment of reality takes the 
shape of certain perceptual images resulting from 
unconscious phantasies. Students of this sort are led by 
certain images by which teachers, if they are the cause of 
distress, are identified with a fictional image that may 
lead to humor. This fictional image is characterized by 
identifying one trait with the whole person. In his short 
paper, "A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession," 
Freud describes these obsessive images as "caricatures" 
which derogatorily "replace a whole person by one of their 
organs 11 33 or by a joking expression such as, for example, 
the teacher is "all ears" or a "walking encyclopedia" or a 
"nobody." In this case, it is the "internal perceptions" 
which "yield sensations of processes arising in the most 
31. S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, p. 215. 
3 2. Ibid, p. 2 2 0. 
33. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 346. 
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diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the 
:mental apparatus." 34 So, these internal perceptions stored 
in the deepest levels of the psyche provide us with some 
notions about the "readiness" to activate the defense 
:mechanism of denial. They also imply that the readiness to 
deny is associated with the "character" of the person. In 
this sense, we have in mind the typology of personality 
traits discussed in chapter two. More precisely, 
unconscious fixation on certain perceptions seeking 
. satisfaction arises to eclipse the painful reality, and, 
consequently, the mechanism of denial operates by warding 
off the impinging painful perceptions. 
It is true what Shakespeare says in Hamlet "the 
readiness is all." This works both ways; as already 
mentioned there is the "wish" to deny, and, also, there 
exist internal and external disturbances which facilitate 
the need to deny. As Louis Linn puts it, "Just as 
disturbances of perception facilitate denial, so does a 
need for denial result in disturbances of perception. 11 35 
This means that the need for denial causes "inexact 
observations." According to Freud, what causes this 
inexact observation is an "expression of the rebellion of 
34. s. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 11-12. 
35. Louis Linn, "The Role of Perception in the Mechanism 
of Denial," Journal of American Psychoanalytic 
Association, October, 1953, No. 4, Vol. 1, p. 695. 
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the id against the outer world." Subjugated by its two 
masters the reality-ego shows an "unwillingness to adapt 
itself to necessity. 11 36 In this psychological state of 
mind students show a tendency to: 
1) be careless in regard to their school work, 
2) be forgetful, 
2) fantasize and to substitute reality by wishful 
thinking. 
As Freud puts it, "It is from this world of fantasy that 
neurosis draws the material for recreating the world afresh 
according to its desires, and it finds this material there, 
as a rule, by way of a regression to an earlier period in 
real life. 11 37 The neurotic denial makes possible a partial 
withdrawal of the quantity of "cathexis" from the external 
or internal world. This withdrawal of cathexis causes 
diversion of the person's attention as a defense against an 
impinging anxiety-provoking situation. As a result, the 
perception of a given situation is withdrawn and the ego 
under the influence of the pleasure principle reconstructs 
a hallucinatory or a fantasized nonthreatening reality. 
Consequently, these unhappy students live in the reality of 
their graduation day rather than the reality of finals. 
Fantasy or suppression of a given stimulus is not 
denial per se. Either can be the vehicle of a "central 
36. S. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 279. 
37. Ibid, p. 281. 
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wish" which is "infantile" in nature by which regression to 
a state of "pleasure" is achieved. This is to say, the 
quantity of excitation impinging from the external world is 
reduced to a minimum. 
As mentioned earlier, according to Freud, the first 
step to civilization is the renunciation of instinctual 
demands. The id's impulses are like "mobs," "blind" and 
know no morality. But, although a part of the ego is in 
the id, yet, in some sense, the id is external to the 
reality-ego. For self-preservation the reality-ego tries 
to ward off painful or threatening impulses from the id in 
the same way that it wards off painful or threatening 
stimuli from the external world. In this regard we may 
consider that denial of the external reality occurs only 
when this reality, though not painful as it is, evokes the 
desires of the id which constitute, on their own terms, a 
threat to the moral principles of the student concerned. 
Let us imagine a female student who finds herself in a 
classroom with an extremely handsome teacher. Having him 
in front of her stimulates her sexual desires towards him. 
But, how can this be, since she was taught that a student 
should not sexually desire her teacher? This student falls 
in conflict, torn between her attraction to her teacher and 
her moral values. Being a good student with a respectable 
average, she has to find a solution. But what solution 
does she seek? The solution she seeks is the denial of the 
115 
cause of her intolerable anxiety. This is to say, the 
teacher's physical presence. She might close her eyes, 
iook constantly at her notebook or comes up with any other 
means by which her visual perception is "repressed." 
conducting herself in such a way, we can say that she 
"heard" and "understood" the lecture very well. In his 
paper, "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance," Freud explains an 
extreme case, 
It would appear as though repression on the part of 
the ego had gone too far and poured away the baby with 
the bath-water, for the ego now flatly refuses to see 
anything at all, since the sexual interests in looking 
have so deeply involved the faculty of vision. The 
other presentation of the situation, however, is 
probably closer to the fact, the aspects in which we 
see the active part in the process played by the 
repressed scoptophilia. It is the revenge, the 
indemnification of the repressed impulse, thus 
withheld from further psychical development, that it 
can succeed in so boldly asserting its mastery over 
the organ which serves it.38 
The case refers not only to this partial denial, but 
to a more general understanding of relationships or "co-
existence." Having the visual perception as an important 
vehicle in object relationship, what is really being 
38. Ibid, p. 110. 
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frustrated here is her "co-existence" with another. This 
frustration of emotions for one reason or another "electsn 
the disruption of visual perception as a mode of 
expression. So the partial loss of "co-existence," i.e., a 
way of refusing to live a certain reality, fear of breaking 
the moral laws, is "translated" by the suppression of 
perception. More generally, we observe a tendency to break 
away from life itself. To repeat ourselves, thinking 
psychoanalytically means thinking an "equivocal" verbal or 
nonverbal language. In other words, what is important is 
what language refers to. 
Carrying on with the language of psychoanalysis, a 
traumatic experience finds expression in different 
symptoms. The ego encounters the involvement of the blind 
id with any perceptual faculty and decides to abandon a 
conscious control over the situation. A symptom is formed 
conveying a message of either rejecting reality by blocking 
the perception of it or rejecting reality by inducing that 
which fulfills the craving to recapture a dreamy state. 
Both have one common denominator, i.e., the triumph of the 
pleasure principle. For example, a person who stops eating 
symbolizes, as Merleau-Ponty says, the breaking away from 
life, since the "swallowing symbolizes the movement of 
existence which carries events and assimilates them; the 
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patient is unable, literally, to 'swallow' the prohibition 
which has been imposed on her. 11 39 
A parallel to these symptoms of denial can be 
encountered in gluttons, alcoholics and users of drugs. 
Injecting food, alcohol or drugs into the body symbolizes 
the infant's sucking the mother's breast as a prelude to a 
sleeping state. In his book, The Psychoanalysis of 
Elation, B. Levin gives us detailed cases on how sometimes 
a person achieves denial by eating and becoming like the 
"jolly fat man. 11 40 In other words, he is like an infant 
who captures an identical state of infantile narcissism. 
This "jolly fat man" captures an identical state of 
infantile narcissism. The French saying "Apres moi le 
deluge" precisely describes his attitude; an attitude which 
explicitly uncovers an extreme destructive attitude to the 
existence of the world of relationships. 
Conclusion 
Denial is a primitive mechanism. It is that which 
makes regression, the inexplicable phenomenon, possible. 
Being primitive means that its existence in the human 
psyche is prior to the "cleavage" of the ego and the 
superego. So encountering denial also means encountering 
39. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 160. 
40. B.D. Levin, The Psychoanalysis of Elation (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1950), p. 62. 
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that which causes it, namely, separation, anxiety and 
perception. 
These three important notions are inextricably 
interwoven. One implies the occurrence of the other. 
separateness implies anxiety; and anxiety refers to a 
threat of an impinging "danger" which starts as the mother 
being absent. The absence of the mother becomes the 
"prototype" of all impending danger whether from the 
external or from the internal world. Experiencing extreme 
anxiety leads to a distortion in the person's perception. 
The ego withdraws its control and becomes an instrument of 
the repressed impulses. consequently, denial of the so 
called dangerous situation is bound to take place. 
Now, what is the weapon we need to possess in facing 
danger? The answer is possessing the virtues. What do we 
need fo-r this "excellence" to be lived? The answer is: a 
virtuous life. This implies building the virtuous 
character. For Freud, attaining a virtuous life is not an 
easy task, 
Actions and consciously expressed opinions are as 
a rule enough for practical purposes in judging 
men's characters. Actions deserve to be 
considered first and foremost; for many impulses 
which force their way through to consciousness 
are even then brought to nothing by the real 
forces of mental life before they can mature into 
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deeds. In fact, such impulses often meet with no 
psychical obstacles to their progress, for the 
very reason that the unconscious is certain that 
they will be stopped at some other stage. It is 
in any case instructive to get to know the much 
trampled soil from which our virtues proudly 
spring. 41 
That said, the purpose we hope to achieve in the next 
chapter is the answer to the following question: what are 
some of the virtues implied in Freud's psychoanalysis? 
41. S. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 659. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Section One 
--What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, 
acquire it to make it thine 
(Goethe, Faust, Part One) 
Introduction 
This chapter is comprised of two sections. The first 
deals with the notion of common sense, and the second deals 
with two major issues in psychoanalysis: psychopathology 
and the theory of cure. In both sections we venture to 
answer the following question: What are the virtues implied 
in Freud's psychoanalysis? In order to strengthen our 
investigation we have decided to draw a parallel or to 
search for an articulation between what is implied as 
virtue in Freud's thought and Aristotle's Ethics. 
As to the section on common sense, our purpose is to 
show the profound quality of Freud's thinking which served 
him well as a means to articulate different disciplines in 
one discipline called psychoanalysis. To prove our point 
we are going to consider Freud's way in approaching the 
subjects of slips, dreams and persons. Reaching a 
considerable clarity on these issues, we will see what is 
the virtue in Aristotle's Ethics that qualifies Freud's 
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style of thinking. 
This leads us to the second section in which we see 
how Freud's thought is put in action and verified by human 
experience as it unfolds in the clinical setting. As we go 
on with our investigation, we will also observe how Freud's 
ideas on psychopathology and on the theory of cure have 
profoundly added a new dimension to the notion of virtue, 
the unconscious virtues. 
Common Sense 
In this section we are going to consider a direction 
in Freud's literature which has been overlooked by many 
researchers. It is a direction we need to see in order to 
understand how being-in-the-world is so important in 
Freud's theory. Although it does not obey the method of 
theoretic speculation; yet it is considered to be an 
indispensable catalyst for any deliberate methods. This 
direction is called "common sense," or "good sense," or 
"native shrewdness." It is, as mentioned earlier in the 
second chapter, acquired from the experience of mere 
living. So the major question to be answered is: how does 
Freud put this "native shrewdness" to use in his 
psychoanalytic search? 
Freud's interest in clinical search did not eclipse 
his interest in the remarkable resources that human 
cultures have offered throughout history. In his own 
production, he reproduces these resources and articulates 
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them in his psychoanalytic findings. In other words, he 
makes them relevant as "evidence" and "devices" for an 
underlying depth and also for "far-reaching" speculations. 
This is one of the reasons which makes psychoanalysis 
"intuitively graspable" as we encounter it challenging the 
logic of the illogic. 
Being-in-the-world simply implies not denying the 
world. On a commonsensical level oftentimes we use what is 
given to us. Although we reach a point of experiencing 
overwhelming contradictions and inconsistencies for which 
we are unable to provide ourselves with intellectual 
explanations, our "practice" and "experience" serve us as 
tools by which we come to possess a "felt-meaning" of the 
context of these situations. Having a comprehension of 
this context redeems our threatened attitudes by keeping a 
relationship with the world. It is not uncommon to 
experience a person who is able to make a desperate 
situation livable by referring to the proverbial French 
statement "c'est la vie." 
How does Freud defend this commonsensical stance? The 
intellectual scientific circles of Freud's time accused his 
psychoanalysis of being nothing but "mere talk" or 
"exchange of words." To this he responds, 
Words and magic were in the beginning one and the 
same thing, and even today words retain much of 
their magical powers ..•. Words call forth 
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emotions and are universally the means by which 
we influence our fellow creatures. 1 
What Freud implies is not the needless use of words but 
communication, relationship and uncovering of attitudes. 
communication is crucial to analysis. In this regard, 
Freud maintains that the patient "will make the 
communications necessary to the analysis only under the 
conditions of a special affective relationship to the 
physician; in the presence of a single person to whom he 
was indifferent he would become mute. 11 2 Freud continues to 
defend himself by saying that the importance of 
psychological attitude in which resides an important 
development of a complicated organism is "foreign" to those 
scientists who are accustomed to give anatomical, chemical 
or physical explanations to phenomena. He says to those 
scientists, "for this reason a psychological attitude of 
mind is still foreign to you, and you are accustomed to 
regard it with suspicion, to deny it a scientific status, 
and to leave it to the general public, poets, mystics, and 
philosophers."3 
The underlying crucial point emphasized is that 
relationships are pivotal in the process of comprehending 
1. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to 
Psychoanalysis, Trans. Joan Riviere (Garden City, New 
York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1943), p. 19. 
2. Ibid. 
3 . Ibid . I p . 21. 
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and living in the world around us. But, sometimes, words 
used in communication seems to be unintelligible. Their 
occurrence gives the impression of an accidental happening 
stemming from no apparent beliefs, attitudes and conscious 
intentions. As mentioned earlier, for Freud there is an 
inherent readiness to achieve or to express something. 
This is to say, there is an "idea of design," i.e., a 
tendency which has to achieve its purpose. R. Audi says, 
"there can be unconscious wants and unconscious beliefs in 
a sense at least very close to the ordinary sense of •want' 
and 'belief' .... These can figure in motivational 
explanations in fundamentally the same way as conscious 
'beliefs' and 1 wants. 1 "4 These unconscious beliefs and 
wants are not strangers to our everyday life experiences. 
It needs no hard proofs to see that what seems to be an 
accidental utterance shows to every common person that 
there is a disguised intention underlying it. We, 
oftentimes, hear children exposing a teasing tone to each 
other when indirectly a child unconsciously substitutes a 
word for another. Detecting such unconscious intention is 
something we experience and understand from our everyday 
common sense experience, and Freud uses these experiences 
as evidences to his theory. How? 
In his article "Freudian commonsense", Adam Morton 
4. Robert Audi, "Psychoanalytic Explanation and the 
Concept of Rational Action," Monist, Vol. 56, No. 3 
(July 1972), p. 446. 
125 
maintains that Freud allows in his explanations the 
contributions of the everyday experiences to his theory: 
nthe way in which Freud applies the theory give us some 
idea of how to expand commonsense so as to obtain our 
intuitive ..• " 5 descriptions of personalities, characters 
and incidents. In his "Psychology of Errors'', Freud 
encourages us to learn from phenomena which are frequent 
and observed not only in neurotics but in very healthy 
individuals. More precisely, he makes us aware that there 
is a kind of knowledge which is non-theoretical. In this 
connection, he makes use of it and gives what it deserves 
of intellectual explanations. Working with what is given 
is an important step in every scientific investigation. 
Freud maintains, "Anyone thus breaking away from the 
determination of natural phenomena ... has thrown over the 
whole scientific outlook on the world (Weltanschauung) .6 
He substantiates this attitude by referring to the 
religious outlook on the world and how it is more 
articulate than the attitude of a scientist who believes 
that physical science is the only form of scientific 
knowledge, "One may point out to him how much more 
consistent is the religious outlook on the world, which 
emphatically assures us that not one sparrow shall fall to 
5. Adam Morton, "Freudian Commonsense," in Philosophical 
Essays on Freud, ed. Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 70. 
6. S. Freud, Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 27. 
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the ground except God wills it. 11 7 
Slips 
Experiences such as "slip of the tongue" or "slip of 
the pen" are a kind of such recurrent natural phenomenon 
which show slight "disturbances" and "inaccuracies" of the 
mental performance. Usually they happen when a person is 
"tired," "excited" or the person's intentions are 
"absorbed" in other things such as wishes, hopes, desires, 
etc ...• In "The Psychology of Errors" Freud uses the works 
of the two philologists Meringer and Mayer to identify 
these slips. The distortions are differentiated as 1) 
interchanges, 2) anticipations, 3) perseverations, 4) 
compoundings, and 5) substitutions. In the same essay 
Freud gives an example to each one of these slips. 
Interchanges - the hotel-boy knocking at the bishop's 
door, nervously replied to the question "who is it?" 
"The Lord, my boy.118 
Anticipations - "the thought lies heartily" instead 
of: "the thought lies heavily on my heart. 119 
Perseveration - "A member of the House of Commons 
referred to another as the 'honourable member for 
Central Hell,' instead of 'Hull. 111 10 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 31. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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Compounding - A gentleman asks a lady if he may 
"insort" her on her way instead of "escort" her.11 
Substitutions - "Amongst those present was His 
Highness the Clown Prince" instead of the "Crown 
Princen12 
According to Freud, unconscious mental processes seek to 
find their purposeful expressions. In other words, what is 
absent to the conscious mind disrupts it and makes itself 
present in a disguised way. From this we come to 
understand that there is "meaning" behind what seems to be 
unintelligible. The meaning lies in the "intentionality" 
or the "tendency" of the mental processes. As we have 
already observed, a person shows a tendency to say the 
opposite of what is to be said. As such we can also assume 
the position that there is in the core of the human psyche 
a readiness for self-correctiveness or a tendency for 
negations. In other words, there lies a tendency for an 
unconscious honesty. 
Dreams 
The difficult theory of dreams shows the impasse Freud 
faced in connection with the scientifc circles of his time. 
During those hard times, researchers concerned themselves 
with the object of dreams only for the purpose of 
explaining and interpreting their "physiological theories." 
11. Ibid., p. 32. 
12. Ibid., p. 30. 
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philosophers like Wundt and Jodl, as Freud refers to them 
in his "Difficulties and Preliminary Approach to the 
subject," concerned themselves not with dream 
interpretations but with descriptions of how dreams diverge 
from the waking life.13 This divergence show itself in the 
suspending of the critical judgment of the person. In 
spite of this impasse, Freud pursued his search for the 
hidden meaning which lies within this natural phenomenon of 
sleep. 
Freud believes not only in the perseverance of 
scientific research but also in the perseverance of the 
wisdom inherited throughout the ages. For Freud, a true 
scientific method contains the use of all forms of 
knowledge as given to us in the assumptions of science, 
philosophy, mythology, literature, traditions, etc .... 
"Let us adopt the assumption of the ancients and of simple 
folk, and follow in the footsteps of the dream-interpreters 
of old. 11 14 In this sense, Freud uses what has become of 
rudimentary knowledge as a fertile soil for intellectual 
elaborations and explanations. How? 
In tackling dream interpretations he had to clarify 
his stand on the notion of sleep. As mentioned earlier in 
the first and the third chapter, sleep is a way of warding 
off external reality, i.e., a suspension of the person's 
13. Ibid., p. 78. 
14. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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interest in the external world. In this respect, according 
to Freud, being in the world is a state of existence which 
"unwillingly" happened to us. But with a lived experience 
this world becomes endurable by periodically withdrawing 
from it. So, in order to give meaning to this withdrawal, 
he resorts to what is said in everyday life. For example, 
a working person may say at the end of a laborious day, 
"Leave me in peace, for I want to sleep. 11 15 The response 
of a young child is different. It seems that Freud was 
aware of the difficulties mothers face during the sleeping 
time of their children. A child says, "I won't go to sleep 
yet; I'm not tired, I want more things to happen to me1 11 l6 
Sleeping is the royal road to dreaming. Dreams are 
the language of sleep. In order to interpret this 
language, Freud also refers to the cultural heritage given 
to us on a silver platter. In other words, Freud uses what 
people in their everyday life understand without being 
formally taught anything about it. In "Symbolism in 
Dreams", he maintains, "we derive our knowledge from widely 
different sources: from fairy tales, and myth, jokes and 
witticisms, from folklore, i.e. from what we know of 
manners and customs, sayings and songs, of different 
peoples, and from poetic and colloquial usage of 
15. Ibid., p. 79. 
16. Ibid. 
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ianguage. 11 17 So in the use of these different sources, we 
notice how parallel the content of these sources is to 
dream symbolisms. In the same essay, Freud gives us the 
evidence. 
The human body is usually symbolized in a dream by a 
house. This is to say, windows, doors, and gates are 
symbols of entrances to cavities in .the human body. Freud 
uses colloquial expressions to prove his point, e.g. saying 
someone who is not quite right that he is living in the 
"upper storey." or, the openings of the body are referred 
to as "portals." Moreover, he makes use of proverbs in· 
order to prove the same point, such as referring to a woman 
with a "developed bust": "She has plenty of wood in front 
of her house" (Die hat viel Holz vor dem Hause) .18 
Freud's intellectual excellence goes deeper than the 
use of sayings as evidences of proofs. He oftentimes 
refers to the etymology of words in order to uncover the 
hidden meaning of a word. For throughout history, words 
have undergone different transformations without losing 
their essential meaning. With such a context we come to 
realize why "wood" comes to be a symbol of a woman or a 
mother. For Freud, Holz (wood) is derived from a Greek 
word which means raw material. He compares the German word 
with how it came to be in Latin and later in Portuguese. 
17. Ibid., p. 142. 
18. Ibid. I p. 142. 
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The latter shows that "madeira" means wood which is a 
modified version of the Latin word "materia" which means 
material in general. In the same framwork "materia" comes 
from the word "mater" which means mother who conceives and 
gives birth.19 
So the "dream work" undergoes the same 
transformational process as language in the process of 
cultural usage. This means that the unconscious wants and 
wishes retain their urge for self-expression. But due to 
the resistance of the "censor" the original meaning which 
expresses itself in different shapes and forms waiting to 
be deciphered. In "The Dream Work" he says, 
But the peculiar thing about the way in which the 
dream-work proceeds is this: its material 
consists of thoughts, some of which may be 
objectionable ••• , but which nevertheless are 
correctly formed and expressed. The dreamwork 
transmutes these thoughts into another form, and 
it is curious and incomprehensible that in this 
process of translation - of rendering them, as it 
were, into another script or language - the means 
of blending and combining are employed.20 
In addition to the different derivations which unfold in 
the process, there lies a sort of "ambivalence." This 
19. Ibid., pp. 144-45. 
20. Ibid., p. 153. 
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means that in a certain aspect of language formation the 
word carries within itse,lf its own opposite. Freud gives 
us these examples: 
1. Latin: 
altus = high or deep 
sacer = sacred or accursed 
2. German: 
stimme = voice, stumm = dumb 
3. English: 
Persons 
Without: "with" has the "signification" of 
"adding to" and to "depriving of. 11 21 
Freud's characterization of people he encountered in a 
clinical setting and in everyday life situations shows his 
remarkable ability to use common sense description. His 
description is designed in such a way that none of these 
persons is to be looked at as strange or weird no matter 
what the sickness was. It is as if Freud wants to give us 
the impression that behind these common sense descriptions 
lies a great power of psychological insight informally 
developed in a cultural setting. How is this evident in 
Freud's writings? To answer this question two examples are 
going to be considered: one from a clinial setting and 
another from an average life situation. We start with the 
latter. 
21. Ibid., p. 159. 
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In the third chapter we showed how Freud describes 
Sophie's son as a "good boy." In this respect, it is 
evident in the literature that Freud does not resort to a 
conceptual analysis as it is argued in R. Straughan's book 
can We Teach Children to be Good? of what it means to be a 
"good boy." Freud simply encourages the use of what is 
normally considered as a good boy. Sophie's son might have 
broken his mother's vase, but this does not make him a bad 
boy neither to his parents nor to Freud nor to his 
neighbors. In other words, the general perspectives in 
virtue of the boy's behavior dilute his wrong doing and 
make it normal to a boy of his age. All in all Sophie's 
son is a good boy. Freud's intellectual observation shows 
how this little boy was mastering in a playful way the 
tragedy of separation from the mother; and in virtue of 
this activity this boy is leading himself to a good life; 
and therefore, he is a good boy. This is to say, this boy 
performed his first "civilized" act. Intuitively, we come 
to grasp the significance of the validity of this 
commonsensical description. It shows that there is a 
perspective guided by its context -- practice and 
experience -- and systematically developed with an informal 
and insightful flexibility. In our colloquial language we 
describe a person who possesses this quality as a person 
who "knows what's what." 
Now, let us move to a situation in which Freud 
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characterizes a woman who caused an embitterment to her 
family by her nonsensical ideas. In his "Psycho-Analysis 
and Psychiatry" Freud describes her as follows: 
I found her a well-preserved lady, fifty three 
years old of age, of a friendly, simple 
disposition, who gave without hesitation (an] 
account of herself. She is most happily married 
and lives in the country with her husband who 
manages a large factory. She cannot say enough 
of her husband's kindness and consideration .... 22 
In spite of his complicated theory of personality, Freud 
describes this woman in a way which makes her 
"intelligible" as a person. He introduces her in terms of 
manners as a person we should know with certain lasting 
characteristics rather than the way she appears in a 
clinical situation, i.e. the temporary attacks of jealousy. 
What Freud is trying to convey is that a person's 
"character" traits are more rooted than some transient 
neurotic attacks. This means that after therapy she falls 
back on what was a stronghold in her style of action, i.e., 
"friendly" with "simple disposition." This is to say, she 
falls back on her modesty, kindness, and other virtues 
which constitute her character. These character traits 
refer to a system of values prized by her culture, and 
Freud does not hesitate to articulate these values in his 
22. Ibid. I p. 221. 
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intellectual pursuit. 
Now let us pose this question: What are the virtues 
implied as Freud tackles some major issues in 
psychoanalysis? We would like to remind the reader that we 
do not intend to emphasize the virtues in Freud's 
character. What we really intend to emphasize is how 
psychoanalysis, the product of Freud's thought, is a school 
of thought in which the virtues are descriptively implied. 
Considering this, let us begin with the virtue of 
"high-mindedness" or "magnanimity" as discussed in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. One of its main 
characteristics is that "magnanimity seems, even going by 
the name alone, to be concerned with great things. 11 23 In 
spite of his early concern in the physiological 
understanding of the human self Freud never concealed from 
his close friend Fliess that philosophy was his main 
objective. Thomas Nagel in his essay "Freud's 
Anthropomorphism," quotes Freud, 
I see that you are using the circuitous route of 
medicine to attain your first ideal, the 
physiological understanding of man, while I 
secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same 
route at my own original objective, philosophy.24 
23. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV:3, 1123 & 35. 
24. R. Wollheim, Philosophical Essays on Freud, citing 
Thomas Nagel, 11 Freud's Anthropomorphism, " p. 2 2 9. · 
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And what is greater than wisdom, the sole search of 
philosophy and the desired "love" of a philosopher? 
Moreover, the scope of magnanimity according to 
Aristotle is "honour" which is qualified as "the prize for 
the finest (achievements]." 25 To ask the question about 
these finest achievements Freud honoured and diligently 
used, the answer is in what we already discussed in this 
section, namely, traditions as they are implied in fairy 
tales, the proverbs of the common people, the mythologies 
of ancient cultures, the insights of the religious 
traditions, the understanding and reasoning of philosophy 
and mathematics, and finally, the methods of the physical 
sciences. At the extreme level Freud did not hesitate to 
make "great claims" in order to reflect the "worth" of his 
attitudes, discoveries, challenges and contributions. If 
pronouncing his "great claims" and giving "worth" to his 
discoveries are "rightly" done, then he is an 
"intermediate" in Aristotle's language. This is because of 
"what he thinks he is worthy of reflects his real worth, 
while the others are excessive or deficient. 11 26 
But for things to be rightly done persons need to be 
committed and "faithful" to their convictions. These 
characteristics imply a sense of confidence which is rooted 
in the virtue of courage. In the Rhetoric, Artistotle 
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV:3, 1123b, 19-20. 
26. Aristotle, NE, IV:3, 1123b 13-15. 
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defines confidence as "the hope accompanied by a mental 
image, of things conducive to safety as being near at hand, 
while causes of fear seem to be either non-existent or far 
away. Confidence is inspired both by the remoteness of 
calamities and by the proximity of sources of 
encouragement. 11 27 What concerns us in this definition is 
the notion of safety as it is related to courage and 
confidence. This means that persons should utilize all 
available resources to defend themselves as well as to 
defend their ideas. In this connection, it is evident how 
Freud brought psychoanalysis as a new language to this 
present century. Using his already mentioned resources, he 
also brought a new method to hermeneutics;28 he articulated 
the language of science and mysticism with 
psychoanalysis;29 and he contributed new perspective to 
morality and ethics.JO With such high quality achievements 
it is very difficult to deny the confidence, courage and 
faithfulness which armed his character. 
27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1932), 11:5, 1383A. 
28. For a detailed discussion of this matter see Paul 
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), pp. 37-56. 
29. For a detailed discussion of this matter see David 
Bakan, "Science, Mysticism and Psychoanalysis," 
Catholic Psychological Record, Vol. 4 (Spring 1966), 
1-9. 
30. For a detailed discussion of this matter see Heinz 
Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New York: 
International Universities Press, 1960). 
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' To conclude this section, Freud's use of common sense 
as a device and evidence is understood in connection with 
other forms of knowledge. He interlocks different 
disciplines, stretches them out and strives for clarity, 
demonstration, explanation and differentiation. He relates 
and embraces what is considered as opposites, and puts them 
in a context nourished by practice and experience which 
guides understanding to the enigmatic world of the mind. 
Having this reconciliatory style, Freud teaches us the 
appreciation of great things not only as something worth 
having, but something we already possess as people who 
belong to a culture and able to stretch out to other 
cultures. In order to retain and value what we have we 
need faithfulness; a quality rooted in confidence· and 
courage. In other words, being-in-the-world a person needs 
the building of character; and the vehicle is the building 
of the virtues. 
Our purpose is not to go in details on those issues. 
Suffice to say that in Freud's thought there is an 
articulation between what has become a comon sense 
knowledge with what is intellectual. Both alter each other 
as if Freud, for practical reasons, employs principles 
derived from common sense as well as principles derived 
from intellectual scientific investigation. He artfully 
alternates them to make psychoanalysis intuitively as well 
as rationally intelligible. 
Section Two 
Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied, 
And vice sometime's by action dignified. 
Within the infant rind of the weak flower 
Poison hath residence and medicine power; 
For this, being smelt, with that part cheers each 
part; 
Being tasted, slays all sense with the heart. 
Two such opposed foes encamp them still 
In man as well as herbs, grace and rude will, 
And where the worser is predominant, 
Full soon the canker death eats up that plant. 
--Shakespeare 
Romeo and Juliet, 
Act II, Sc. III 
Two important notions are going to be considered in 
this section: psychopathology and the theory of cure as 
Freud introduces them in his psychoanalytic literature. 
Since our purpose is the notion of virtue as it is 
descriptively implied in psychoanalysis, we are going to 
try to explore the general framework by which Freud and 
Aristotle's perspectives can be articulated. This is to 
say, we are going to consider the disposition which makes a 
human being capable of functioning well. Considering this, 
we need to remind ourselves that functioning well is a 
matter of degree. 
To begin with, let us consider Aristotle's general 
definition of virtue. In his Ethics, Aristotle says, 
Our proposition, then ... enables us to say that 
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virtue in a man will be the disposition which (a) 
makes him a good man, (b) enables him to perform 
his function well."31 
It is evidently clear that for Aristole living a good life 
is synonymous to living a virtuous life. The question we 
would like to pose is, how can we see in Freud's 
understanding of psychopathology this disposition which 
enables a person to "perform his function well?" 
Psychopathology 
To a large extent we can consider Freud a 
dialectician. Having a look at the structure of the psyche 
we cannot but observe the "antithetic" intentions of the 
agents, thanks to the temperate state of the ego which 
exercises a control over the distressing promptings of the 
id and the superego. Using the appropriate resources, the 
ego from time to time rightly suppresses these distressing 
promptings in order to retain a certain degree of 
confidence. 
But in certain situations this confidence is weakened 
as it becomes overriden by these "antithetic ideas" and 
gives in to an unbalanced struggle of the extreme demands 
of the id, superego, and the external world. This 
stressful situation leads a person to situations of 
31. Christian Hoff Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Evervday 
Life (New York: Harcourt, Jovanovich, 1985), p. 148, 
citing Artistotle, "The Moral Virtues" from the Ethics 
of Aristotle, trans. J.A.K. Thompson, George Allen & 
Unwin Publishers, p. 150. 
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uncertainty, fear and anxiety accompanied by an inner 
desire to recreate the lost balance. How? By sending a 
message to the external world called "symptom." What does 
this tell us? It tells us that there is a sort of 
"intelligence" in the psyche which enables the psyche to 
perform its function well by disclosing a "compromise" 
achieved by all the agents in a form of a "symptom." 
In the second chapter we mentioned that according to 
Philip Rieff, psychonalysis teaches us the virtue of 
compromise and the virtue of prudence. How do we 
understand this perspective? Briefly we will sketch how 
the process of compromise takes place. In the Ego and the 
Id, Freud maintains that neurosis is rooted in an 
unresolved Oedipal complex.32 Having in mind the mechanism 
of "compulsion to repeat 11 33 as Freud exposes it in details 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the repressed material, 
e.g., "I want to get rid of my father" has never been 
sublimated or anticathected. The individual continues to 
repress these murderous wishes by using energy from the ego 
and the superego. This is to say, the id lustfully desires 
and the superego counteracts these wishes with a tyrannous 
"Thou shalt not." These antithetic intentions confront 
each other at the unconscious level. With both mechanisms 
32. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans J. Riviere (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1962), p. 15. 
33. S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J. 
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1959), p. 9. 
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the "return of the repressed" and the "compulsion to 
repeat" the promptings of these repressed wishes come close 
to invade the boundaries of the conscious mind. 
As these opposed intentions -- id desiring and the 
superego commanding -- keep straining each other the 
individual starts to experience a break-down in the defense 
mechanism. Consequently, this conflict has to show itself 
in a way not known to the conscious ego, and the process of 
"compromise" starts to maneuver itself. This means that 
the three agents reach an agreement by which each one 
obtains a certain satisfaction. This agreement is 
expressed in a physical symptom. 
The significance of this compromise lies in the fact 
that a murder does not happen. In the same context the 
superego punishes the person with the physical symptom and 
the unconscious ego uses this disturbance in order to gain 
the affection of the desired object, the mother. 
A resolution such as this shows how the extreme wishes 
of the id and the extreme commands of the superego give in 
to an extreme compromise called neurosis. In other words, 
the individual experiences an extreme-mean, i.e. a less 
extreme function to perform a less dangerous act. In our 
understanding, the purpose of this compromise is the 
expression of the inner conflict which shows itself in the 
form of psychological illness. It is an unconscious 
"prudent" expression of a tactful manifestation of the 
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psyche. For example, having a paralyzed arm is better than 
committing a murder. How similar this is to the biblical 
saying about lusting which states that it is better for a 
person to pluck his eye out rather than his or her whole 
body burn in the eternal fire of hell. What seems to have 
happened on the unconscious level is a comparison between 
most extreme consequences, i.e. putting the promptings of 
the desire into action -- killing the father, or the choice 
of falling sick. Obviously, the latter is chosen. 
What becomes evident in this discussion is that for 
Freud, building the virtues is a process with a muddy 
trail. The process of conscious deliberation as Aristotle 
teaches us is, in Freud's perspective, paralyzed by these 
inner unconscious disruptions. This implies that the 
unconscious "structure" is not taken into account by 
Aristotle. As W. Richardson puts it, "Here, indeed, one 
must admit the discovery of something specifically new by 
Freud that does affect profoundly the field of ethics.n34 
Also, R. Audi says that persons have conscious beliefs and 
wants as well as unconscious ones. In the same line, we 
assume that persons have a sort of unconscious 
deliberation. This must not surprise us since, according 
to Freud, part of the ego is linked to the unconscious. In 
34. William Richardson, "Ethics and Desire," paper 
delivered at a meeting of the Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Loyola 
University of Chicago, 1986. 
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other words, the interrelated activities of the agents of 
the psyche facilitate and give way to such an unconscious 
constellation of mental activities. This perspective shows 
that Freud's contribution to the field of ethics is the 
existence of unconscious virtues by which the psyche 
desires to regain its homeostatic function. 
What we already discussed shows that for Freud there 
is a deeper underlying discourse (logos); a logos deeply 
interconnected with the power of myth. The myth is that of 
Oedipus Rex. In this regard, logos is confined neither to 
consciousness nor to logic. It allows myth to encompass, 
to articulate, to express and to recollect in an enigmatic, 
interlocking and elusive way. It relates, connects and 
reconciles opposites. It desires coherence rather than 
fragmentation, expression rather than repression. The 
message sent by the neurotic is an unconscious message to 
the conscious minds of the other persons in the external 
world. It says, "I have a problem! Please help." Thus, a 
compromise which expressed itself in sickness now becomes a 
healthy compromise. The latter is facilitated by an 
external agent. More precisely, there is a deep underlying 
structure which performs its function well; and Freud 
psychologically explains, analyzes, and demonstrates the 
existence of these unconscious performances. It is a vital 
and a vigorous virtue. It has its own logic and style of 
deliberation. Now, the question we would like to answer 
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is, how do we see this process in Freud's theory of cure? 
Theory of Cure 
The process starts with free-association, reenactments 
and then deliberation. The purpose is coherence and the 
power to articulate. It answers the unconscious message 
the neurotic sends to the external world. How? The 
therapist develops an "insight" into the patient's problem. 
Insight becomes the means by which the interplay of 
opposites is perceived and understood. In order to gain 
this insight the therapist first employs the technique of 
"free association." 
In a clinical setting Freud allows the analysands to 
speak whatever comes to their minds whether relevant or 
irrelevant thoughts. The reason for employing this 
technique lies in the fact that patients come to get 
therapy with two opposing motives: the first is to get 
help, and the second is to resist therapy,35 as they tend 
to be afraid of being discovered. The technique of free 
association helps the patients to relax their resistance by 
lowering the level of "censorship.'' These spontaneous 
verbal expressions give the psychoanalyst the opportunity 
to collect much material until the whole picture falls into 
place. Waiting to build insight into the repressed wishes, 
the therapist remains passive using some tactful feedbacks 
whenever the patient fails to get started again. What does 
35. s. Freud, Standard Edition (London), Vol. II, p. 268. 
146 
this attitude permit us to understand? 
By allowing the patients to freely express themselves, 
the therapist acts as a watchful testing ego to the reality 
of the "upward drive" of the desiring id. This means that 
patients act as if they were id and the therapist takes the 
role of the patient's ego in order to deliberate on the 
causes of illness. That said, we would like to pose this 
question. What are the attitudes a therapist must have to 
achieve the competency to cure? To answer this question we 
must consider Freud's recommendations on the method of 
treatment. His recommendations cluster around one 
important characteristic. It is the self-controlled 
characteristic. How does he go about these 
recommendations? He goes about them by emphasizing that 
therapists must not exceed their means nor impose on the 
patients what is not within their capacity. 
The first recommendation given is that a therapist 
must avoid the excess of attention on the patient's 
problem; for 
one begins to select from the material before 
one; one point will be fixed in the mind with 
particular clearness and some other consequently 
disregarded, and in this selection one's 
expectations and one's inclinations will be 
followed.36 
36. s. Freud, Collected Paper, Vol. II, p. 324. 
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What Freud is suggesting is an "evenly-hovering attention." 
rt is this sort of attention which makes meaning 
recognizable not on the spur of the moment, but later. 
This is to say that, for Freud, one has to listen without 
being troubled by the efforts "to keep in mind anything in 
particular.n37 By this attitude the therapist allows the 
"unconscious memory" to act in "full play" and also allows 
oneself to give way to any emerging surprises. With such 
an attitude the therapeutic session comes to possess a high 
degree of freedom from the biases and the expectations of 
the therapist. This is why Freud advocates that therapists 
must undergo psychoanalysis in order to exercise self-
control over their complexes and resistances. More 
precisely, he advocates that the therapist must possess an 
"approximate normality." Freud maintains, 
Whoever knows how to appreciate the high value of the 
self-knowledge and increase in self-control so 
acquired will afterwards continue the analytic 
examination of his own personality by a self-analysis, 
and willingly recognize that, in himself as in others, 
he must always expect to find something new.38 
Self-control is exercised in the clinical setting by not 
getting "too intimate" with the patient. The therapist 
should be like a mirror which reflects what is projected on 
37. Ibid., p. 325. 
38. Ibid., p. 325. 
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it. But using the expression "too intimate" does not mean 
for Freud not to "afford" the patient glimpses of the 
therapist's defects and misgivings. On the contrary, the 
relationship must be given a moderate intimacy. Freud 
says, "One confidence repays another, and anyone demanding 
intimate revelations from another must be prepared to make 
them himself. 11 39 
In addition to this moderate and intimate exchange the 
therapist should "restrain himself and take the patient's 
capacities rather than his own wishes as his standard. 11 40 
Ambitiousness, for Freud, is an undesirable element. , 
Patients should be respected for their weaknesses and for 
their "moderate worth." They should not feel compelled to 
go beyond their natural capacity. 
All in all, we notice that Freud mostly considers what 
is conducive to health. He urges students of 
psychoanalysis to assume a self-controlled and a moderate 
attitude. What goes beyond the natural means of the person 
is considered by Freud as unhealthy. How similar is 
Freud's position to Aristotle's definition of the self-
controlled person: 
If something is pleasant and conducive to health or 
fitness, he will desire this moderately and in the 
right way; and he will desire in the way anything else 
39. Ibid. I p. 330. 
40. Ibid., p. 331. 
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that is pleasant if it is no obstacle to health and 
fitness, does not deviate from what is fine, and does 
not exceed his means.41 
with such recommendations it becomes evident that acquiring 
insight into the patient's problem depends on a moderate 
and a prudent clinical relationship between the patient and 
the therapist. This shows the importance of the communal 
aspects of psychoanalysis. Interdependence is necessary 
for building the autonomy of the individual. For this 
reason abstract intellectuality does not override the 
personal experience in the world. Freud defends this 
position. He says, 
I dislike resorting to analytical writings as an 
aid to patients; I require them to learn by 
personal experience, and I assure them that in 
this way they will acquire wider and more 
valuable knowledge than the whole literature of 
psycho-analysis could afford them.42 
Exercising the proper practice and experience, the 
therapist out of a "calm" and a "quiet" attentiveness" 
develops in a later time the insight proper into the 
client's problem. Having this insight at hand, the time is 
ripe to provide it to the patient. 
The principal point is that I should guess the secret 
41. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 1119a, 17-20. 
42. s. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 333. 
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and tell it to the patient straight out; and he is 
then as a rule obliged to abandon his rejection of 
it.43 
This insightful feedback given to the analysand by the 
therapist becomes the possession of the client. The 
reality testing ego restores its articulating power. This 
fruitful relationships shows another important point in 
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis being faithful to its 
premise that the human being is a social creature teaches 
us that there is an underlying unity in what is considered 
to be separate. 
From all that has been discussed in this section we 
need to ask this question: what does psychoanalysis teach 
us about character? We notice that self-control is 
exercised in order to get the best out of the client, i.e., 
"honesty"; honesty about what the client wants to say and 
also honesty about what the client resists saying. To get 
honesty out of another person for healthy purposes means 
that the person concerned is not being exploited, but 
helped in developing an awareness for a basic strategy for 
adaptation and for survival on virtuous foundations. But, 
in order to be a helper, one must have certain character 
traits by which he is distinguished from other types of 
personalities. How can we detect this character trait? 
In the second chapter we used the insights of Jody 
43. S. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. II, p. 281. 
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Palmour in drawing the parallel between Aristotle's 
"generous man" with Freud's "genital man." Having this 
similarity at our disposal we would like to resume our 
investigation in order to show that being a helper is the 
power in the character behind the "generous man." In this 
regard, we will come to conclude that psychoanalysis 
teaches us the virtue of being a helper. Aristotle defines 
the generous man: 
Whatever has a use can be used either well or badly; 
riches are something useful; and the best user of 
something is the person who has the virtue concerned 
with it. Hence the best user of riches will be the 
person who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and 
this is the generous person.44 
Although generosity is concerned with the proper dealing 
with wealth, one must not overlook the fact that the more a 
person tends to be generous, the more this virtue fits the 
mold of a more general framework of virtues. A generous 
person "will give to the right people, the right amounts, 
at the right time, and all the other things that are 
implied by correct giving. 114 5 The general mold is that a 
generous person could be "prudent," "temperate" and "just." 
This is to say that a generous person gives for the purpose 
of promoting the proper development of the taker that he or 
44. Aristotle, Ethics, IV, 1120a, 5-9. 
45. Ibid., pp. 25-29. 
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she might become virtuous. Aristotle says 
For it is more proper to virtue to do good than 
to receive good, and more proper to do fine 
actions than not to do shameful ones; and clearly 
[the right sort of] giving implies doing good and 
doing fine actions ..•• 46 
That said, we find that a temperate character with a 
generous character in action forms a constellation of deeds 
which renders help to the person concerned and to others. 
In other words, a virtuous person is the one who tactfully 
helps with a benevolent attitude and with refined manners. 
This is parallel and articulate with how a proper helpful 
relationships is built in a psychoanalytic session. 
Our discussion about developing an insight into the 
patient's problem shows that deliberation on the part of 
the therapist takes place. We also come to realize that 
tqe therapist deliberates on what is to be the cause of the 
problem. In this process the therapist takes over or 
adopts the patient's ego in order to choose what is really 
linked to the problem as the patient discloses in a free 
situation. In other words, there are efforts on the part 
of the therapist to find an answer to the question of how 
the patient acts in response to his or her desire. This 
question brings us closer to Aristotle's stand in regard to 
the object of choice. 
46. Ibid., pp. 12-15. 
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We have found, then, that what we decide to do is 
whatever action among those up to us we 
deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also 
decision will be deliberative desire to do an 
action that is up to us; for when we have judged 
[that it is right] as a result of deliberation, 
our desire to do it expresses our wish.47 
In chapter two we discussed that the notion of desire is a 
common for Freud and Aristotle. But in our understanding, 
psychoanalysis reveals to us two orders of desire: first, 
the unrequited desire, i.e., the desire for the mother as a 
lost object, and secondly, the desire which the message of 
illness sends, i.e., the desire of the ego to regain its 
diplomatic artful role between the two masters and the 
external world. The similarity between Freud and Aristotle 
lies in what facilitates the "art" of living. For both 
Aristotle and Freud, we come to desire in accord with our 
deliberation. This is the sole function of the ego and the 
purpose of psychotherapy. 
Our aim will not be to rule off every peculiarity 
of human character for the sake of a schematic 
"normality," nor yet to demand that the person 
who has been "thoroughly analyzed" shall feel no 
passions and develop no internal conflicts. The 
business of the analysis is to secure the best 
47. Aristotle, Ethics, III, 1113a, 10-15. 
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possible psychological conditions for the 
functions of the ego ..• 48 
What is really obvious in Freud's position is that the 
desire for the lost object will never stop its pursuit of 
its object. But what is really the crucial issue in this 
matter is what is conducive to health, moderately desired 
and in the right way; for too much id desiring is extreme 
sickness, too much of the laws of the superego is also an 
extreme sickness. What is really conducive to health is 
the mean reached upon the deliberation of the ego. This 
means settling down for what is realistic and healthy. 
But to achieve the crucial aim of analysis by securing 
the best possible conditions for the functions of the ego, 
the usual free-association techniques will not suffice. As 
we have seen, it is a technique by which the client 
spontaneously reports relevant or irrelevant thoughts. 
This disclosure may help in developing the therapist's 
insight into the patient's problem, but it is not 
sufficient for achieving the cure pursued by analysis. 
Why? 
Having in mind the conflicting and disruptive powers 
of the agents of the psyche, we come to realize that the 
free-association technique is also disrupted by an 
unconscious resistance which Freud described as a process 
of regression to the unconscious regions of the mind. 
48. s. Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 250. 
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Whenever in our analytic delving we come upon one 
of the hiding-places of the withdrawn libido, 
there ensues a battle; all the forces which have 
brought about regression of the libido will rise 
up as resistance against our efforts in order to 
maintain the new condition.49 
It is a mechanism which accompanies every step of the 
treatment. 
Every step of the treatment is accompanied by 
resistance; every single thought, every mental 
act of the patient's must pay 'toll to the 
resistance, and represent a compromise between 
the forces urging towards cure and those gathered 
to oppose it.50 
Here the picture comes to be clear that resistance is the 
process which interrupts the progress of the therapeutic 
session. It also shows the "ambivalence" the patient 
carries to the analytic session. What emerges next? 
According to Freud, the exploration done by the 
analyst as it conflicts with the resisting unconscious 
urges of the patient brings the flow of free-association to 
cessation. Entering into this scene, resistance draws out 
one of its own "weapons" which Freud calls "transference." 
Transference is the mechanism by which the analysand 
49. s. Freud, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 316. 
50. Ibid. 
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"merges the physician with the object of his emotions. 11 51 
How does this serve our investigation? 
In the second chapter we discussed that one of the 
common places between Freud and Aristotle is the notion of 
"activity" which, according to Aristotle, is considered the 
heart of virtue. For example, a person may act 
courageously without knowing the conceptual analysis of 
courage. In this connection, the phenomenon of 
transference is the process by which the analysand 
unconsciously acts out the buried vile and unpleasant 
wishes and brings them out to the open. The question to be 
addressed is, how are these vile and unpleasant wishes 
related to an act of virtue? 
In our understanding, the virtuous act in this acting 
out lies in its disclosure. It is this disclosure that 
really does help the analysis to lead to a fruitful result, 
i.e., the possible conditions for the proper functions of 
ego which lead to a proper conscious deliberation 
concerning the object of choice. We can also express this 
position in the language of the following middle-eastern 
proverb which says that one cannot tame a beast without 
catching it. This is exactly what the analyst tries to do. 
Freud comments on the importance of transference. He says, 
As we raise the transference by making it 
conscious we detach only these two components of 
51. Ibid. I p. 318. 
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the emotional relationship from the person of the 
physician; the conscious and unobjectionable 
component of it remains, and brings about the 
successful result in psycho-analysis .... 52 
Freud continued to assert the values of the results of 
psychoanalysis as they pertain to health. These values are 
social in their nature. The autonomy of the person is 
achieved by being an interdependent being. This is to say 
that in the therapeutic session the patients' self-
knowledge is obtained by another. Freud expresses the goal 
of therapy as follows, 
The eventual independence of the patient is our 
ultimate object when we use suggestion to bring 
him to carry out a mental operation that will 
necessarily result in a lasting improvement in 
his mental conditions.53 
In order to obtain this independence the analyst puts 
certain rational requirements on the analysands. First, 
their perturbed emotions should fit into their life-
history, and second, subject them to rational 
considerations and evaluate them at "their true psychical 
values. 11 The transference manifestation proves to be the 
battle field on which the struggle of opposing forces takes 
place. It also proves to be a means of uncovering that 
52. Ibid., p. 319. 
53. Ibid., pp. 319-20. 
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which should be tamed by the power of reason. 
This struggle between physician and patient, 
between intellect and the forces of instinct, 
between recognition and the striving to 
discharge, is fought out almost entirely over the 
transference-manifestations. This is the ground 
on which the victory must be won, the final 
expression of which is lasting recovery from 
neurosis. It is undeniable that the subjugation 
of the transference-manifestations provides the 
greatest difficulties for the psychoanalyst; but 
it must.not be forgotten that they, and they 
only, render the invaluable service of making the 
patient's buried and forgotten love-emotions 
actual and manifest; for in the last resort no 
one can be slain in absentia or in effigy.54 
Now we would like to pose this question: With what attitude 
is the activity of transference to be qualified? The 
answer is truthfulness. According to Aristotle, 
truthfulness is a virtue. It is the mean between the 
booster and the self-deprecator. Hence, a truthful person 
is someone 
Who is truthful both in what he says and in how 
he lives, when nothing about justice is at stake, 
simply because that is his state of character. 
54. Ibid., p. 322. 
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Someone with this character seems to be a decent 
person. For a lover of the truth who is truthful 
even when nothing is at stake will be still 
keener to tell the truth when something is at 
stake.55 
What we gather from this definition is that truthful people 
show sincerity in both deeds and words. They are 
"equitable." They give us a sense of confidence since they 
try neither to exaggerate nor to depreciate. 
Relating this characteristic disposition of 
truthfulness to what is disclosed in a clinical session, we 
notice that seeking for help the client must possess an 
inner drive to know about what causes the problem no matter 
what is really at stake. Asking for help from someone 
means that people have confidence in the therapists' 
truthful suggestions as well as in themselves as they 
strive to regain a realistic sense of their world and of 
themselves. In spite of the ambivalence they come with, 
this inner drive for truthfulness speaks in free 
association and acts out in transference. 
Underlying the resistance and the ambivalence of the 
patient lies a kind of trust in the therapist who acts 
truthfully, diplomatically and intimately. The therapist 
is, like the ego, an artful diplomat in giving the 
opportunity for the hidden truth to slip out of the 
55. Aristotle, Ethics, IV, 1127b. 
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client's mouth as well as the opportunity for this ~idden 
painful truth to be acted out. Allowing the concerned 
impulses the expression they deserve, the therapist uses 
all the available material to confidently form the insight 
needed for the diagnosis. Having the insight at hand, the 
truth is told and the conscious rational ego steps into a 
safer territory to resume his feeble but persistent 
function. 
Conclusion 
What does our discussion of the psychopathology and 
the theory of cure allow us to say? The locus of our 
discussion points to the idea that there is an articulation 
between what is pathological and what is healthy. This 
articulation presupposes that in every psychological 
sickness there is a healthy message sent to the external 
world which allows through another the necessary condition 
for the restoration of health. This healthy message is 
detected by a certain conscious and unconscious 
acknowledgement of the patient that there is something 
wrong going on which leads this patient to seek help. 
But to deal with such paradoxical situation, i.e., 
pathology speaks health and vice versa, we come to realize 
that in the human psyche there are unconscious activities 
whose aim is health. These activities we call unconscious 
virtues, e.g., the virtue of compromise, the virtue of 
prudence and the virtue of truthfulness. Moreover, these 
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virtues are acted upon consciously by the therapist whom we 
considered as possessing the virtue of helping another. In 
order to help another, the therapist must possess the 
virtue of self-control as well as the virtue of self-
knowledge. Both are, to some extent, mediated by the link 
drawn between the therapist and the client during the 
therapeutic session. It is a link built by many negative 
and positive activities, such as, free association, 
resistance and transference. Through the insight gained by 
such clinical activities, the patient regains the lost and 
the desired "approximate normality." More precisely, 
strengthening the diplomatic functions of the ego is the 
sole purpose of psychotherapy. This is to say, the more 
reality testing the less pathology. 
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Epilogue 
Finally, the question we would like to pose is, what 
sense can we make of Freud's interrogation about denial? 
More exactly, what is the philosophic perspective we gather 
from our investigation? The route which Freud attempted to 
follow is the pathological. It is in this direction that 
Freud's most daring interrogation turned upon 
schizophrenia, the most regressive of all pathological 
illnesses. It is also through schizophrenia that Freud 
found his way to prove the enigmatic unconscious, and 
through its excessive regressive mechanism, he came to 
understand denial as a primitive mechanism. 
In spite of being a primitive mechanism, absolute 
schizophrenia for Freud is an "idee-limite". This is why 
we emphasized in both chapters one and four Freud's general 
perspective that whenever there is pathology there is a 
hidden tendency for articulation. In other words, denial 
presupposes avowal of the situation denied. It follows 
that the necessity of articulation demands the necessity of 
avowal as well as the necessity of denial of the loss which 
reality affirms. 
This manner of interrelating or joining together poses 
the general context of Freud's interrogation. To 
understand this context is to understand Freud's 
163 
philosophical outlook. With what perspective are we able 
to see this context? The answer lies in the articulation 
between the pathological and the normal. This is to say, 
we see it in the underlying implicit articulation between 
the normal and the abnormal. But due to the ambiguity in 
Freud's texts precise definitions of the normal and the 
pathological are not available. Then, what? How can we 
allow this ambiguity to feed our purpose in understanding 
Freud's underlying philosophical perspective? 
In the first chapter we stated that sleep is denial of 
the external reality. Also the psychotic phenomenon of 
dreaming is common to the pathological as well as to the 
normal. What we come to understand is that the normal and 
the pathological are interrelated in a dialectical fashion. 
It is also worth noting that Freud came to understand the 
normal from explicating the pathological. In chapter four 
we mentioned that Freud recommends that a therapist does 
not have to be fully healthy; a therapist must have an 
"approximate" health. So, it is in terms of the dialectic 
that Freud comes to understand normality. Normality in a 
person is that which combines certain neurotic and 
psychotic features. This is fully understood in the 
purpose he prescribes to therapy; i.e., the well 
functioning of the ego as it faces the disruptions of the 
id, the superego and the external world. Even in the most 
extreme psychological illnesses we find that the tendency 
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lands safely on the right track. So, what really gives 
meaning is neither the normal nor the pathological 
considered separately, but as they are conducive to the 
dialectic process. 
It is in relation to this context that denial could be 
considered as that which ruins, i.e., vice. It is a vice 
because the dialectic process which articulates, moderates, 
interlocks, and gives the hidden implicit meaning is 
disturbed by the excessive or deficient manifestation of 
denial. It is in the dialectic that we come to understand 
that, in case of illness, what is normally considered 
healthy becomes hidden and unseen. This is to say, that 
when vice is overriding there is an unconscious virtuous 
activity which intends to recover the lost harmony. 
What does this dialectic process mean for persons as 
beings-in-the-world? It is that progressive movement which 
is concerned with becoming. It leads persons from what 
they are to what they are meant to become. It encompasses 
a "totality" in which people experience that which is 
explicitly present and also that which is implicitly 
present somewhere, i.e., they experience "presence-absence" 
as well as "absence-presence." This is the kernel point we 
discussed in chapter three. It is the notion of separation 
which signifies the human presence in the world. In the 
same chapter we came to conclude that denial of separation 
means denial of relationships. The person regresses to a 
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stage where the external world, to a large extent, is 
warded off; a condition which satisfies the infantile I, 
i.e., "I am it" rather than "I am not it." 
Acknowledging the separation is the first achievement 
by which persons relate to what is external to themselves. 
This includes culture, institutions and persons. It is 
through separation that they become related to a world 
which they acknowledge as an entity out there. This world 
has its own communal demands. It robs people of their 
individuality; and it is through this world that 
individuals search and refined themselves as independent or 
autonomous individuals. It is similar to the relationship 
the therapist develops with the patient. This is also well 
expressed in the biblical tradition which emphasizes that 
one must lose himself or herself in order to find it. In 
the language of psychoanalysis what is found is only found 
as something that was lost. 
Finding oneself in an indeterminate world with a 
multitude of beings, the "split" or the separation from 
others is what really "defines" the person as a social 
being who acts not only as a separate individual, but as a 
separate individual who is linked by the dialectic movement 
to the "totality" to which he or she is open as a means for 
self fulfillment. While people avow their individuality, 
in the same movement they deny it as they tend to encounter 
the world in its totality. It is a to and fro movement. 
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Appropriate as it is, this to and fro movement makes 
of denial a part of the dialectic which leads to 
articulation. But this should not divert us from our 
consideration of denial as vice as discussed in the second 
chapter. Since the dialectic process is what gives the 
underlying meaning of what are considered opposites, or 
implicit and explicit, or conscious and unconscious, denial 
as vice is subjugated to this dialectical process by 
evoking that which functions well to make the person as a 
person with a link to other beings; and, consequently, to 
the world as a totality in general. It is separateness 
which is presupposed in order to establish the link with 
another. That said, separation becomes the signification 
of being-in-the-world. 
This general dialectic process is what enhances the 
individuals' prog~essive walk towards their inevitable 
death. It is not regressive as it is observed in 
schizophrenia. It is what really articulates opposites, 
e.g., the regressive psychotic mechanism of sleep as it is 
connected to the progressive activities of our everyday 
life. This, according to Freud, proves that absolute 
normality or absolute pathology is a "cas-limite." Within 
this context we come to understand Paul Ricoeur's 
description of psychoanalysis as a new language; a language 
which conceals that which is revealed in it and vice versa: 
implicit/explicit, conscious/unconscious, hidden/manifest, 
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pathological/normal, real/unreal 1 • logical/illogical, 
known/unknown etc. It is a language which feeds and is fed 
by ambiguity, understood dialectically and comprehended in 
its progressive revelation. 
As much as this dialectical process is actualized the 
human being is, according to Lacan, the "discourse of the 
other. 11 56 Being as such, the person is open to a 
"totality" which is revealed as absent/present; a reality 
which conceals in order to reveal and vice versa. Guided 
by this context the human development is understood as a 
discourse between the pathological and the normal. Human 
nature, as we understand Freud's outlook, is patho/logical. 
The early loss the inf ant experiences is primarily a 
traumatic incident to be avowed; an avowal for which the 
infant as a growing being is expected to pay a high price. 
This is understood in terms of suffering the unrequited 
desire for the lost object, i.e., the mother. As a result 
of avowing this inevitable traumatic situation, the infant 
is recognized by another and also, growing to be a child, 
he or she is bound to recognize the other. Only through 
this tragedy, according to Freud, does the infant become a 
social being. In the peek-a-boo game the child comes to 
reconcile himself or herself to this tragedy--
absent/present. In this situation the child does not 
56. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1981), p. 170. 
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impart knowledge, nor tries to inform, but "evokes" a 
relationship with another. This also applies to the "Fort-
da" game through which the child evokes a relationship with 
what is absent/present. In this regard, a language is not 
only a vehicle of information, but an instrument to evoke 
relationship whether in words or in actions. More exactly, 
language is the acknowledgement of another; and by the fact 
of this acknowledgement the child steps into a community of 
humans. 
Within this context we considered denial in its 
extreme or less extreme case as vice. The schizophrenic or 
the neurotic refuses to acknowledge the tragedy of 
separation, and in the same line refuses to acknowledge 
himself or herself as a person belonging to a community of 
humans. In the state of a pathological denial the world 
does not exist independently of oneself because that which 
overrides his or her being is a regressive rather than a 
progressive movement, i.e., the triumph of the pleasure 
principle. 
What Freud invites us to understand is that living the 
drama of life needs endurance. Endurance is achieved by 
building the character; a character neither dominated by 
the laws of morality nor the blind desires of the id. 
Freud implies the art of living which is acquired by 
practice and experience. 
What makes us endure? What is the form that shapes 
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practice and experience? The answer to these questions is 
the building of the virtues. By the virtues we build 
proper relationships and also by the virtues we bravely 
succeed and we bravely fail. Learning the virtues as we 
already implied in our investigation is by formal or 
informal teaching; a teaching which is primarily achieved 
by "relationship", not only by passing on information. 
Psychoanalysis is never considered by Freud an 
educational theory for the classroom. But, undoubtedly, it 
is educational if we consider the assumption that Rousseau 
gives us which says that the best educated person is the 
one who lives the joys and the sorrows of life. 
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